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ARTICLES
Designing Administrative Law for
Adaptive Management
Robin Kundis Craig*
J.B. Ruhl**
Administrative law needs to adapt to adaptive management. Adaptive
management is a structured decisionmaking method, the core of which is a
multistep, iterative process for adjusting management measures to changing
circumstances or new information about the effectiveness of prior measures or
the system being managed. It has been identified as a necessary or bestpractices component of regulation in a broad range of fields, includingdrug and
medical-device warnings,financialsystem regulation,social welfare programs,
and naturalresources management. Nevertheless, many of the agency decisions
advancing these policies remain subject to the requirementsof either the federal
Administrative Procedure Act or the states' parallel statutes. Adaptive
management theorists have identified several features of such administrative
law requirements-especially public participation, judicial review, and

*
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of Law, the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, and Vanderbilt Law School for their
comments on drafts of this article.
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finality--as posing barriers to true adaptive management, but they have put
forward no proposals for reform.
This Article represents the first effort in adaptive management theory
to go beyond complaining about the handcuffs administrative law puts on
adaptive management and to suggest a solution. The Article begins by
explaining the theory and limits of adaptive management to emphasize that it
is not appropriatefor all, or even most, agency decisionmaking.For appropriate
applications, however, we argue that conventional administrative law has
unnecessarily shackled effective use of adaptive management. We show that
through a specialized "adaptive management track" of administrative
procedures, the core values of administrative law can be implemented in ways
that much better allow for adaptive management. Going further, we propose
and explain draft model legislation that would create such a track for the
specific types of agency decisionmaking that could benefit from adaptive
management.
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The administrativestyle that has characterizedAmerican
public law from the New Deal to the 1980s has been out of
favor in recent years.
-Charles Sabel and William Simon'
I. INTRODUCTION

In the never-ending project to build a better regulatory state
mousetrap, two of the most seductive reinvention models to emerge over
the past few decades have been market-based regulation2 and adaptive
management. 3 Representative of two broad and opposing thrusts of
regulatory reform, one advocating "minimalism" 4 and the other

1.
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 54 (2011). For a summary and critique of regulatory reform
models prevailing throughout the last few decades, see Jodi L. Short, The ParanoidStyle in
Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 634 (2012).
2.
For a sweeping review of the concepts and history of market-based regulation, see
MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 3 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds.,
2007) [hereinafter MOVING TO MARKETS].
3.
For the seminal description of adaptive management, see INT'L INST. FOR APPLIED SYS.
ANALYSIS, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 1 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978).

For a more recent synthesis of adaptive management theory, see PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING
TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 3 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds.,

2002). See generally infra Part L.A (tracing the history of adaptive management).
4.
Minimalism "seeks to ground policy design in economic concepts and market practices,
and to minimize frontline administrative discretion and popular participation in administration."
Sabel & Simon, supra note 1, at 54-55.
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"experimentalism,"5
market-based
regulation
and
adaptive
management originate from the same premise but move in starkly
different directions. This Article examines the path that adaptive
management has taken and proposes how to steer it out of a dead end
by changing the inner workings of administrative law.
The starting point for both regulatory reform models is the
depiction of administrative agencies as having become boxed into a
decisionmaking process that depends heavily on a culture of
comprehensive rational planning and prescriptive regulation.6 The
dominant decisionmaking method used to implement this regime relies
heavily on two related attributes: (1) the use of "front-end" analytical
tools comprehensively conducted and concluded prior to finalizing the
decision, and (2) the assumption of a robust capacity to predict and
assess the market and nonmarket impacts of any proposed action.7
However, this approach constrains agency flexibility by demanding
hyperdetailed predecisional impact assessments, intense public
participation during the decisionmaking process, and postdecision hard
look judicial review.8 The combined effect of this procedural gauntlet,
codified in large part through the federal Administrative Procedure Act
5. Experimentalism's "governing norm in institutional design is reliability-the capacity for
learning and adaptation." Id. at 55.
6. See J.B. Ruhi & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 424, 437 (2010) (discussing the central attributes of the modern agency-decisionmaking
process).
7. For example, regulations promulgated under the Endangered Species Act require federal
agencies, prior to carrying out, funding, or authorizing an action, to "[e]valuate the effects of the
action and cumulative effects" and decide "whether the action, taken together with cumulative
effects, is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(3)(4) (2009). Cumulative effects are "those effects of future State or private activities, not involving
Federal activities, that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area." Id. § 402.02. In
other words, the agency must decide, once and for all, whether an action taken today will
jeopardize a species at some point in the future. The agency may revisit its decision only if the
action remains subject to continuing federal control and either new information or modifications
of the action present effects that were not previously considered. See id. § 402.16 (discussing when
reinitiation of formal consultation is required).
8. Professors Sidney Shapiro and Robert Glicksman have produced a rich body of
scholarship exploring the conventional "front-end" approach to agency decisionmaking. See SIDNEY
A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK, at x (2003) (suggesting that
pragmatism, rather than utilitarianism, is the "appropriate baseline from which to design and
implement risk regulation"); Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation
Through IncrementalAdjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1179 (2004) (advocating a shift in focus
from "front-end" regulatory adjustment to "back-end" regulatory improvements, including use of
adaptive management); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, The Missing Perspective,
ENVTL. L.F., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 42, 42 ("Instead of the increased 'front end' examination of
regulations, such as cost-benefits analysis, that is pushed by the critics-and is causing stagnation
of rulemaking-a pragmatic approach would look at a regulation's actual 'back end' effects after
promulgation and make incremental adjustments as needed.").
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("APA")9 and its state counterparts, has been to channel self-preserving
agencies into cramming all that could possibly be thought or dreamed
about actions they carry out, fund, or authorize into single-shot, allencompassing decision extravaganzas. Especially in rulemaking, this
impetus toward up-front comprehensiveness strongly encourages
agencies to steamroll their decisions through public-comment scrutiny
and judicial review litigation and then never look back.' 0 Reopening or
reconsidering a completed and judicially blessed decision in such an
environment is anathema to any sane agency.
To be sure, even under the pressure of these external "rationalinstrumental" constraints on agency discretion," the front-end mode of
administrative decisionmaking does produce agency decisions sooner or
later, even decisions of momentous import and magnitude. However, it
cannot be denied that this mode of agency decisionmaking has also been
subjected to withering criticisms that it ossifies agency practices,
politicizes agency decisions, stultifies flexibility, and generally makes
administrative agencies unadministrative. 12

9.

5 U.S.C.

§§ 551-59, 701-06 (2012).

10. See J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. Scl. &
TECH. 21, 34-53 (2005) (noting that most administrative agencies are increasingly required to
engage in predecisional activity geared towards public participation and judicial review before
promulgating a rule or adjudicating a decision).
11. Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the
Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 464-65 (2012) (critiquing the "rationalinstrumental" model of administrative decisionmaking and proposing a "deliberative-constitutive"
model based in more iterative, discursive use of professional agency judgment); see also William
Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2332079 (providing an
overview of "the most dysfunctional features of canonical [administrative law] doctrine - both the
excessively burdensome ones and the excessively lax ones" and contending that they all derive
from a "highly limited and increasingly anachronistic conception of public administration.")
12. See William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and CapriciousReview
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 393-95 (2000) (pointing out criticisms that hard look review
has ossified the informal rulemaking process); Thomas 0. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood
Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly PartisanAge, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1671 (2011) (noting that
"regulated industries, and occasionally beneficiary groups, are willing to spend millions of dollars
to shape public opinion and influence powerful political actors to exert political pressure on
agencies"); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992) (noting that the informal rulemaking process has become increasingly
'rigid and burdensome"); Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 100-45 (2004) (providing a broad critique of the
public participation-judicial review model of administrative law); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483-89 (1997) (discussing criticisms that the informal
rulemaking process has become "unnecessarily cumbersome").
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Market-based regulation, a darling of minimalism theory,
responds to these criticisms by replacing some measure of agency
discretion with the dynamic organizing power of markets and economic
incentives.13 The job of agencies in this approach is to set up the
framework in which market forces can operate and then sit back and
watch the elegance of economic incentives drive market-participant
behavior in the desired direction.14 In environmental regulation, for
example, so-called pollution cap-and-trade systems have the agency
prescribe aggregate, industry-wide pollution loads; allocate initial
pollution units to industry participants; and set up the rules for trading
those units; from there, however, the market defines the unit price and
drives trading behavior.15 Similarly, conservation-banking programs
allow one landowner to destroy natural resources, such as wetlands or
endangered species' habitat, and offset the lost ecological values by
purchasing resource credits in an open market from another landowner
who has created or enhanced similar resources. 6 The point of such
programs is specifically to remove agency discretion from decisions
about trading partners, prices of credits, and other features taken over
by the regulatory market, the theory being that the market can perform
those functions more efficiently and effectively than can agency
expertise and intervention.' 7 Indeed, with the agency removed from the
picture, at least partially, the market-directed portion of the process
also effectively supplants public participation and judicial review-the
market is the public, and the market does not get it wrong, so judicial
review is unnecessary. At least, that's the theory of market-based
regulation.

13. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 1, at 57 (noting that "minimalists look to economics for
norms and practices that obviate official discretion").
14. Notably, even as far back as 1975, legal scholars considered the elimination of
administrative agencies and a return to the pure market as a possible solution to increasing agency
discretion. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L.
REV. 1667, 1689-93 (1975).
15. See A. Denny Ellerman, Are Cap-and-Trade ProgramsMore Environmentally Effective
than ConventionalRegulation?, in MOVING TO MARKETS, supranote 2, at 48 (comparing cap-andtrade to prescriptive regulation); Karen Fisher-Vanden & Sheila Olmstead, Moving Pollution
Trading from Air to Water: Potential,Problems, and Prognosis,27 J. ECON. PERSP. 147, 148 (2013)
(examining air- and water-pollutant trading programs).
16. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, "No Net Loss": Instrument Choice in Wetlands Protection,
in MOVING TO MARKETS, supra note 2, at 323 (describing wetlands banking).
17. See Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad, PrescriptiveEnvironmental Regulations Versus
Market-BasedIncentives, in MOVING TO MARKETS, supranote 2, at 3 (market-based theorists posit
that "[n]ot only would market instruments be easier and cheaper to administer than prescriptive
regulation, they would harness the profit motive in the service of environmental protection and
dramatically reduce implementation costs").
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Championing experimentalism, adaptive management offers a
much different path away from the conventional front-end model of
decisionmaking. The key move is not to carve away agency discretion,
as market-based regulation does, but to add to it, albeit in a vastly
different form compared to the front-end model.18 The idea of adaptive
management is that agencies should be free to make more decisions,
but that the timing of those decisions is spread out into a continuous
process that makes differentiating between the "front end" and the
"back end" of decisionmaking much less relevant. 19 Rather than make
one grand decision and move on, agencies employing adaptive
management engage in a program of iterative decisionmaking following
a structured, multistep protocol: (1) definition of the problem, (2)
determination of goals and objectives for management, (3)
determination of the baseline, (4) development of conceptual models, (5)
selection of future actions, (6) implementation and management
actions, (7) monitoring, and (8) evaluation and return to step (1).20
Formal, time-limited public participation junctures, such as the noticeand-comment process of conventional APA-style administrative
rulemaking, are not a component of adaptive management; rather,
public input is derived through an emphasis on more loosely defined
multiparty
and
involvement"
"stakeholder
for
processes
21
"collaborative planning." With deep roots in natural resources
18. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 1, at 78 (explaining that experimentalism involves
discretion distributed through a more decentralized structure but with centralized coordination);
see also Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, "Improving"Project XL: Helping Adaptive
Management to Work Within EPA, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 155, 166-67 (1999) (arguing that
legislatively allowed adaptive management would increase agency discretion as compared to
conventional administrative regimes).
19. See Lawrence Susskind et al., A Critical Assessment of Collaborative Adaptive
Management in Practice, 49 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 47, 47 (2012) ("Rather than making a single
definitive decision despite information gaps or uncertainty about the systems involved, [adaptive
management] emphasizes learning via the careful monitoring of provisional strategies and
changing conditions, and incremental adjustments in light of new information.").
20. See COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN,
ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN 332-35 (2004) (explaining

the adaptive management decisionmaking process). Adaptive management theorists propose
many configurations of the iterative steps. See infraPart II.A. This protocol is taken from work by
the National Research Council's work on endangered species issues in the Klamath River basin in
the Pacific Northwest. In the interests of full disclosure, Professor Ruhl served on the so-called
"Klamath Committee," including its work on defining and applying adaptive management.
21. See CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE
CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATION 1-2 (2011), available at www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/adaptive

management/plan.pdf (presenting an adaptive management plan for implementation of an air
pollutant trading program); see also Susskind et al., supra note 19, at 49-50 (stressing the
importance of "collaborative planning" in adaptive management); Byron K. Williams, Adaptive
Management of NaturalResources-Frameworkand Issues, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1346, 1348 (2011)

8

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1:1

management theory,22 the adaptive management protocol has begun to

make inroads in public lands management in particular, 23 though it has
been applied or proposed in other policy contexts, including pollution
control, 24 financial regulation, 25 environmental impact assessment, 26
public health and safety, 2 7 civil rights, 28 and social welfare. 29
Market-based regulation and adaptive management have by no
means taken over the administrative state. Rather, they have been used
more opportunistically than holistically, stepping in strategically where
conventional front-end decisionmaking has failed or needs help. Indeed,
they have been used that way in unison in some cases. For example,
when the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") came under heated attack in
the mid-1990s as too blunt a regulatory tool, its implementing agencies
used carefully targeted doses of market-based regulation and adaptive

management to make the regulatory programs more nuanced and

(identifying "stakeholder involvement" as "[a] key step in any adaptive management application").
For elaboration on what these are, see infra Part II.A.

22.

See HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, MAKING GOOD USE OF

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 3 (2011) ("Since the mid-1990s, the concept of adaptive management has
held a prominent place in natural resource management policy in the United States . . . ."). For the
seminal works linking adaptive management with natural resources management policy, see
Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society of America on the Scientific
Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665, 666 (1996), and R. Edward
Grumbine, What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 29-31 (1994).
23. See Jamie McFadden et al., Evaluatingthe Efficacy of Adaptive Management Approaches:
Is There a Formula for Success?, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1354, 1357-58 (2011) (showing a sharp
upward trend of discussion of adaptive management in major natural resources management
journals since 2000); Susskind et al., supra note 19, at 47 ("Collaborative adaptive management
(CAM) is widely touted as the best way to handle natural resource management in the face of
uncertainty, change and conflict.").
24. See Susskind & Secunda, supra note 18, at 169 (discussing an innovative pollution-control
program and reporting that the program was supported by the fact that "important constituencies
within all [stakeholder] groups understand that adaptive management holds great promise for the
improvement of environmental compliance regimes").
25. See Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged
Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1302-04 (2012) (proposing an iterative regulatory regime
for financial institutions).
26. See Julie Thrower, Adaptive Management and NEPA' How a Nonequilibrium View of
Ecosystems Mandates Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871, 894 (2006) (discussing the
integration of adaptive management principles in predecisional environmental-impact
assessments).
27. See William H. Simon, Democracy and Organization: The Further Reformation of
American Administrative Law 35-41 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Grp., Paper No. 12-322, 2012) (discussing the Workforce Investment Act of 1998).
28. See id. (discussing the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003).
29. See id. (discussing the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011).
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flexible at the edges. 30 Although still dominated by front-end decisions
about the status of species for protection and the conditions under
which federal and nonfederal actions can take place in habitats of
protected species, the regulatory program has evolved considerablyand the statute has survived the political assaults-thanks largely to
the administrative reforms.31
As between the two approaches, market-based regulation has a
much longer and more tested track record than does adaptive
management, although the jury is still out on its performance in
numerous applied settings. 32 Concerns with market-based approaches
include, for example, whether pollution trading allows "hot spots" of
intense local pollution to form 33 and whether agencies can balance the
goals of the statute with the administrative goal of maintaining a viable
trading market.34 In general, however, most of these concerns can (in
theory) be addressed through further tinkering with the regulatorymarket frameworks. That is to say, the basic theory of market-based
regulation is firmly in place, and the principles for its design and
application in the field are by now well understood, even if not always
effectively executed. 35
By contrast, the adaptive management trial has only recently
begun, and it is moving slowly and with mixed results. Putting adaptive
management into practice has proven far more difficult than its early
theorists expected. 36 One problem has been translating the theory into
30. See J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the
EndangeredSpecies Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367, 374-400 (1998) (contemporaneously examining
the Babbitt-era reforms).
31. See J.B. Ruhl, Endangered Species Act Innovations in the Post-Babbittonian Era-Are
There Any?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 419, 430-38 (2004) (reflecting on the Babbitt-era
reforms).
32. See Freeman & Kolstad, supranote 17, at 3-15 (providing a comprehensive assessment
of the first twenty years of applied market-based regulation in the environmental policy context);
Lawrence Goulder, Markets for PollutionAllowances: What Are the (New) Lessons?, 27 J. ECON.
PERSP. 87, 87-88 (2013) (tracing "cap-and-trade" theory to the 1960s and its policy applications
from the 1970s forward).
33. See Ellerman, supra note 15, at 51-52 (examining the "hot spots" issue).
34. See Salzman & Ruhl, supranote 16, at 335-39 (examining the difficulties of maintaining
regulatory markets).
35. See Fisher-Vanden & Olmstead, supra note 15, 157-64 (defining criteria for successful
pollutant-trading programs); Goulder, supra note 32, at 100 (stating that cap-and-trade and
pollution taxes, "[w]hen well designed, either form of emissions pricing will offer several
advantages over conventional forms of regulation").
36. See Craig R. Allen et al., Adaptive Management for a Turbulent Future, 92 J. ENVTL.
MGMT. 1339, 1341 (2011) (noting that "despite an illustrious theoretical history there has
remained imperfect realization of adaptive management in [the] real world"); Craig R. Allen &
Lance H. Gunderson, Pathology and Failure in the Design and Implementation of Adaptive

10

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1:1

the legal context of agency practice. It is easy for politicians to command
agencies to "go practice adaptive management" and leave it to others to
figure out how. 3 7 Agencies working in good faith to follow through on
the promise of adaptive management, however, have found themselves
facing a public suspicious of seemingly unbounded agency discretion 38
and courts unaccustomed to the "dial twiddling" of adaptive
management's decisionmaking protocol. 39 Agencies thus are caught
between a rock and a hard place-they must implement adaptive
management to keep in step with dominant management decision
theory, but when they do, they face a tough audience in the public and
judicial forums.
The result has been agencies perfecting and practicing what has
been dubbed "aim lite," a watered-down form of adaptive management
agencies use to play it safe. 40 The first step in an agency's descent into
Management, 92 J. ENvTL. MGMT. 1379, 1380 (2011) ("The implementation of adaptive
management has proven to be difficult."); Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered
Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Protection, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 50, 54 (2001) (noting that "skepticism about adaptive management comes from the
lack of success stories to date"); McFadden et al., supra note 23, at 1358 ("While managers in the
field of natural-resources generally acknowledge adaptive management as an appropriate
approach for managing complex ecosystems, the managers may experience difficulty in proceeding
with the adaptive management process to the implementation stage."); Susskind et al., supra note
19, at 47 ("[Tlhe results have been mixed, with many efforts falling short of the resource
management results that were expected."); Carl J. Walters, Is Adaptive Management Helping to
Solve Fisheries Problems?, 36 AMBIo 304, 304 (2007) (arguing that adaptive management has
"been radically less successful than one would expect from its intuitive appeal").
37. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,508, 74 Fed. Reg. 23,099, 23,101-03 (May 12, 2009) (directing
the EPA to draft pollution-control strategies for the Chesapeake Bay watershed that are "based on
sound science and reflect adaptive management principles," while also directing the Departments
of the Interior and Commerce to use "adaptive management to plan, monitor, evaluate, and adjust
environmental management actions" in the Chesapeake Bay watershed, but not defining any of
these concepts). Alejandro Camacho has outlined the core substantive features of an "adaptive
governance framework as part of organic adaptation planning legislation." Alejandro E. Camacho,
Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning
Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 72-76 (2009). Our focus in this Article is on the procedural
features.
38. DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 22, at 3 ("[E]nvironmentalists argue that adaptive
management places too much open-ended discretion in the hands of agency managers."); Melinda
Harm Benson & Ahjond S. Garmestani, EmbracingPanarchy,Building Resilience and Integrating
Adaptive Management through a Rebirth of the National Environmental Policy Act, 92 J. ENvTL.
MGMT. 1420, 1422 (2011) ("[C]ritics of adaptive management view it as an excuse to allow agencies
an unreasonable amount of discretion . . . ."); Courtny Schultz & Martin Nie, Decision-making
Triggers,Adaptive Management, and NaturalResources Law and Planning,52 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 443, 449-51 (2012) (discussing why the "discretion-based approach to adaptive management did
not sit well with environmental groups").
39. See Ruh] & Fischman, supra note 6, at 439-40 (describing adaptive management as "dial
twiddling" and analyzing the poor reception it has received in courts).
40. See id. at 431-43 (describing agencies' practice of a/m lite).
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aim lite is to dilute the definition of adaptive management into a longwinded abstraction of "learning while doing."41 From there, the agency
can pepper its rules, permits, and policies with promises to employ
adaptive management while making no firm commitments to do
anything in particular.42 At its best, therefore, aim lite simply
supplements agencies' front-end decisions with bold promises to adapt
unspecified parameters of the decision in the unspecified future
through unspecified methods when unspecified conditions arise. 43 At its
worst, a/m lite allows agencies to defer hard decisions indefinitely by
shifting them into the adaptive management black box.44 Like many
plans, an adaptive management plan of a/m lite origin is more likely to
find itself sitting on the shelf than springing into action.
This false start in adaptive management practice has led some
commentators to ask whether implementing adaptive management
consistent with its full theoretic model is truly possible for regulatory
agencies, or whether the whole idea will be ground to pieces by the
administrative state's demands for comprehensive predecisional impact
assessments, relentless public participation, and routine access to
probing judicial review.45 If agencies are committed to adaptive

41. For example, the Department of the Interior defines adaptive management as a decisionmaking process that
promotes flexible decision making that can be adjusted in the face of uncertainties as
outcomes from management actions and other events become better understood.
Careful monitoring of these outcomes both advances scientific understanding and helps
adjust policies or operations as part of an iterative learning process ... . It is not a 'trial
and error' process, but rather emphasizes learning while doing.
BYRON K. WILLIAMS ET AL., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT:

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR

TECHNICAL GUIDE, at v (2009). For similar examples, see Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 43133.
42. For example, rules the Army Corps of Engineers has adopted to implement the Clean
Water Act's wetland compensatory mitigation program require permit applicants to develop an
"adaptive management plan" to "guide decisions for revising compensatory mitigation plans and
implementing measures to address both foreseeable and unforeseen circumstances that adversely
affect compensatory mitigation success." 33 C.F.R. § 332.4(c)(12) (2013). Yet the rules do not go
further in explaining how these plans are to be implemented, leaving it to the local Army Corps
"district engineer, in consultation with the responsible party (and other federal, tribal, state, and
local agencies, as appropriate), [to] determine the appropriate measures." Id. § 332.7(c)(3). The
upshot of the rule is that the adaptive management plan will be used when deemed necessary, at
which time the district engineer, permittee, and other interested parties will figure out how to
adapt. For similar examples, see Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 433-36.
43. See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 22, at 11 ("One of the most significant weaknesses of
adaptive management to date has been that agencies have promised future adaptation but not
delivered it.").
44. See id. at 3 (stating that adaptive management is "at worst a smokescreen for unbounded
agency discretion and a wobbly commitment to program objectives").
45. Craig Allen and his colleagues have noted, for example, that:
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management but unable as a practical matter to move it past a/m lite,
one has to wonder whether these core features of conventional
administrative law-the features that incentivize front-end
decisionmaking-aren't in fact the problem that needs to give ground.
The bottom line may be that either we can leave administrative law
untouched, in which case a/m lite is about as far as adaptive
management will progress, or we can design an alternative
administrative procedure model that enables agencies to practice
adaptive management in its purer form. Indeed, a recent survey of
adaptive management practitioners revealed that most of them believe
implementation of adaptive management has reached this crossroads. 46
Before casting stones on administrative law as the barrier to
moving beyond a/m lite, though, one must also consider whether
adaptive management's acolytes have oversold its virtues and set legal
process up for the fall. Other constraints stand in the way of effective

Legal certainty does not mesh well with environmental unpredictability. . . . The
certainty of law and institutional rigidity often limit the experimentation that is
necessary for adaptive management[,]" and the "adversarial character of
administrative law, combined with the need for certainty (e.g., procedural rules) in the
larger realm of American law, is likely incompatible with adaptive management.
Allen et al., supra note 36, at 1343 (citations omitted). Professor Angelo adds:
Another challenge of adaptive management is that it may be difficult to incorporate
substantial public participation. . . . If we need to wait to convene all stakeholders and
achieve consensus or near consensus before every action, we simply will not be able to
have the quick reaction time necessary for adaptive management.

Mary Jane Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story ofAdaptive Law and EcologicalResilience,
87 NEB. L. REV. 950, 1001-02 (2009). Finally, Professor Karkkainen has argued that:
[T]he adversarial and litigious character of contemporary administrative law coupled
with its overall tendency toward nitpicking enforcement of fixed 'command-and-control'
rules-especially procedural rules, which are singularly easy for courts to enforce-and
its reluctance to countenance uncertainty and lack of information as the basis for
agency decisionmaking are all profoundly at odds with the very concept of adaptive
management.

Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and Back Again, 7
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 59, 73 (2005); see also Ruhl, supra note 10, at 34-36 (identifying
disconnects between adaptive management and conventional administrative procedure); Brian

Walker et al., Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability in Social-Ecological Systems, 9
ECOLOGY & Soc'Y, no. 2, 2004, at art. 5 (citations omitted), available at http://www.ecology
andsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/ ("Adaptive management, widely and deservedly promoted as a
necessary basis for sustainable development, has frequently failed because the existing governance
structures have not allowed it to function effectively.").
46. Professors Benson and Stone report that practitioners do feel hampered by legal and
institutional constraints. See Melinda Harm Benson & Asako Stone, PractitionerPerceptionsof

Adaptive Management Implementation in the United States, 18 ECOLOGY & SoC'Y, no. 3, 2013, at
art. 32, available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/voll8/iss3/art32/ (finding well over seventy
percent not only believed that constraints exist and could specifically name one or more example
of a legal constraint on their work implementing adaptive management; at the same time, finding
"practitioners are generally optimistic about the potential for institutional reform").
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administrative agency adaptive management, not the least of which are
funding, politics, uncertainty, data scarcity, and lack of institutional
capacity.47 Working to get past a/m lite in some contexts thus may be
asking the agency to hit its head against a wall. Even in the best of such
circumstances, moreover, adaptive management also may not be suited
to regulatory contexts (1) in which long-term stability of decisions is
important, such as child labor controls; (2) where decisions simply can't
easily be adjusted once implemented, such as where to locate a
completed highway intersection; or (3) where it is essential that an
agency retain firm authority to say "yes" or "no" and leave it at that.
Hurling the words "adaptive management" at a regulatory problem
thus asks for failure if either the nature of the problem or its practical
context is not well suited for adaptive decisionmaking.
We recognize these limitations on adaptive management and
thus the need for reformers first to sort through the rhetoric of adaptive
management to define where it could truly be usefully and practicably
implemented. Only then can one evaluate how much of a barrier
conventional administrative law poses to doing so. If adaptive
management is promising in some decisionmaking contexts, however,
and administrative law the principal obstacle to fulfilling that promise,
then it is appropriate to ask what an alternative administrative process
would have to look like to unleash adaptive management's potential.
How far would the alternative need to deviate from conventional
administrative law, and would there be unacceptable tradeoffs with
other values administrative law serves to fulfill? An informed
deliberation on the practice of adaptive management in the
administrative state must address these questions-in short, to ask
whether it is administrative law, not the pursuit of adaptive
management, that is maladaptive, and if so, what to do.48 Yet, while
there is broad agreement among adaptive management theorists on the
first point-administrative law has become a barrier to effective
47. See Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript on file with author) (identifying numerous barriers to
adaptive management besides administrative law); Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation
Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 297-98 (2007)
(critiquing the use of adaptive management in the Endangered Species Act); Doremus, supranote
36, at 50-52 (identifying challenges for adaptive management in the administration of the
Endangered Species Act); Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of
Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1239 (2008)
(arguing that adaptive management by agencies pays insufficient attention to substantive goals).
48. As Brad Karkkainen has put it, to consider adaptive management seriously, one must
suspend the premise that "administrative law w[as] somehow immutable and eternal, or at least
of constitutional stature, rather than just another statutory and judge-made legal artifact that
may prove maladaptive at some point." See Karkkainen, supra note 45, at 69.
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adaptive management-what to do about it has not received focused
attention.
This Article represents the first effort in adaptive management
theory to go beyond complaining about the handcuffs imposed by
administrative law and suggest a solution. Theorists (including us)
have proposed the idea of a specialized procedural "track" for adaptive
management,49 but the devil is in the details. Here, we propose the
details. To initiate that inquiry, Part II of this Article grounds the
theory of adaptive management in the real world conditions under
which its pure practice is most likely to be of value. Having identified
those conditions, Part III then focuses on the values of conventional
administrative law and the obstacles they pose for agency
implementation of true adaptive management. Using our proposed
Model Adaptive Management Procedure Act ("MAMPA") as the
analytical foundation, Part IV closes by working through the provisions
of a new administrative law track for adaptive management that
balances those values with the values and practical needs of adaptive
management.
Before going into details, however, some caveats are in order.
First, our proposed adaptive management track is simply an
alternative set of administrative procedures to those found in the
current APA and its state counterparts, designed to facilitate agency
implementation of proper adaptive management in appropriate (not all)
regulatory contexts. We do not propose far-ranging fixes to more
general administrative law problems, such as agency recalcitrance in
implementing statutory mandates or abuse of agency discretion, even
though we admit from the outset that they are theoretically at least as
likely to occur on the adaptive management track as in any other
administrative law context. Nevertheless, because the adaptive
management track accords a participating agency more ongoing
discretion than typical front-end agency decisionmaking, we purposely
have designed our adaptive management track so that an agency's
decision to take it must be considered, deliberate, and-to the extent
that procedural constraints can so guarantee-committed to following
in good faith proper adaptive management procedures.

49. See, e.g., id. at 75 ("One might envision administrative law proceeding on two tracks[,]"
one being a "familiar'fixed rule' track" and the other an "adaptive management track."); see also
Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity is Dead" -Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for
Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARv, ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 17, 66-67 (2010) (suggesting the
need to "restructure those legal safeguards and allow administrative agencies more breathing
room"); J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the RadicalMiddle, 38 IDAHo L. REV. 385, 406-07 (2002) (calling
for greater discretion and more deferential and reduced judicial review for agencies involved in
adaptive management).
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Second, we propose general procedures-like those in the APAthat should be able to govern a wide variety of agency types (financial
and business, health and public safety, environmental, consumer
protection, etc.) in a wide variety of regulatory contexts. Nevertheless,
we acknowledge that the relevant legislature might want to tailor these
procedures for particular agencies or regulatory contexts, as is true in
current administrative law. For example, a legislature may deem
desirable recurrent peer review of how an agency implements adaptive
management for certain agencies or for longer-term projects. Our
proposal is not intended to short-circuit such legislative tailoring any
more than the APA stymies Congress in adding procedural
modifications to particular statutes; rather, like the APA, our proposed
statute provides a general procedural template that legislatures remain
free to tweak as they deem appropriate for particular agencies or areas
of law.
Finally, other than identifying the general context within which
adaptive management is likely to be effective, we confine our analysis
to the administrative procedure of adaptive management. We do not
suggest with any specificity where and when adaptive management
should be used as a matter of policy, nor do we outline how a legislature
might craft a statute conferring substantive authority to an agency to
practice adaptive management. The APA has more than adequately
demonstrated that procedure matters; hence, we believe defining the
procedure of adaptive management is as important as defining its
substance.
Our singular focus is, in other words, on process. Adaptive
management is a structured decisionmaking process in need of a
structured legal process. All adaptive management theorists and
practitioners, and all administrative procedure theorists and
practitioners, have a stake in the project of designing administrative
law for adaptive management. To be sure, adaptive management is not
a panacea for the administrative state, yet it is difficult to conceive how
regulation can function effectively in the future without making true
adaptive management available to agencies in contexts where it is
likely to be useful. The mediums of regulation-technology, the
environment, public health, financial markets, and so on-are
themselves highly adaptive and dynamic. Moreover, forces on the
horizon, such as climate change and increasing globalization, will
further destabilize regulatory contexts.
The question thus is not whether regulation should be adaptive,
but rather where and how to make it so. Early indications from the
adaptive management project are that some of its chief obstacles are
the entrenched features of conventional administrative law. To move
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adaptive management forward in its appropriate applications,
therefore, we must revisit administrative law-we must craft an
administrative law for adaptive management. This Article is intended
to invigorate an active dialogue for that purpose.
II. THE THEORY AND LIMITS OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
If you plug "adaptive management" into a web browser, you will
find over 800,000 sites to explore, including government publications
and websites, academic articles, nongovernmental organizations
devoted to adaptive management, and some pretty elaborate diagrams
of what adaptive management is supposed to look like in practice.
Clearly, the idea has caught on. Nevertheless, even its most fervent
advocates do not propose adaptive management as appropriate for all
regulatory contexts. Indeed, some proponents express concern that
adaptive management is being oversold and thus set up for failure. As
one prominent adaptive management theorist has suggested,
[T]he concept of learning by doing is so intuitively appealing that the phrase "adaptive
management" has been applied almost indiscriminately, with the result that many
projects fail to achieve expected improvements. In many instances, that failure may have
less to do with the approach itself than with the inappropriate contexts in which it is
applied. 50

Adaptive management theorists have thus increasingly focused
on describing success within a particular set of conditions. From there,
practical, political, and normative limits further constrain adaptive
management's application. Given our purpose in this Article to
formulate procedural rules governing adaptive management, it is
important that we draw on this body of work to first clarify the
substantive contexts within which the procedures would apply.
A. Successful Adaptive Management in Theory
The theoretical origins of adaptive management can be traced to
business management, experimental science, systems engineering, and
industrial ecology. 5 1The defining moment for catalyzing it into a robust
model for administrative decisionmaking, however, came with the
publication of an influential book from the late 1970s, Adaptive

50. BYRON K. WILLIAMS & ELEANOR D. BROWN, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR APPLICATIONS GUIDE 11 (2012).

51. Allen et al., supranote 36, at 1340 (noting these origins).
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Environmental Assessment and Management.52 C.S. Holling, the book's
editor, and his fellow researchers found conventional methods for
managing natural resources at odds with the emerging model of
ecosystems as dynamic systems. They focused on the basic properties of
ecological systems to provide the premises of a new assessment and
management method.53 Under a dynamic model of ecosystems, they
concluded, management policy must put a premium on collecting
information, establishing measurements of success, monitoring
outcomes, using new information to adjust existing approaches, and
being willing to change. 54 The traditional management approach of
natural resources policy was "to attack environmental stressors in
piecemeal fashion, one at a time," and to parcel decisionmaking "out
among a variety of mission-specific agencies and resource-specific
management regimes."55 The adaptive management framework that
Holling et al. and other early theorists outlined was more evolutionary
and interdisciplinary, relying on iterative cycles of goal determination,
model building, performance-standard setting, outcome monitoring,
and standard recalibration.56
Since then, adaptive management theory has evolved into two
dominant branches. The Decision-Theoretic School stresses working
with relevant policy stakeholders to define the management problem,
but from there relies principally on agency experts to develop process
models used to guide adaptive decisionmaking.57 By contrast, the
Resilience-Experimentalist School emphasizes maintaining a shared
understanding among the relevant policy stakeholders throughout a
continuous process of learning, hypothesis testing, and experimentation
within the management-problem context.58 Both schools, however,
stress the formalization of a structured decisionmaking process, 5 9 the
52.

See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 1; see

also Allen et al., supra note 36, at 1340 (recognizing the book as influential and describing Holling,
the editor, as "widely recognized as the 'father' of adaptive management"); Kai N. Lee & Jody

Lawrence, Restoration Under the Northwest PowerAct: Adaptive Management: Learningfrom the
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENvTL. L. 431, 442 n.45 (1986) (tracing the
term "adaptive management" to the book).
53. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 25-37.
54. See id. at 1-16.
55. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in
EnvironmentalRegulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1439 (2008).
56. See Allen et al., supra note 36, at 1340 (describing the work of another influential early
theorist of adaptive management, Carl Walters).
57. See McFadden et al., supra note 23, at 1355 (discussing the attributes of the agencyexpertise model).
58. See id. (discussing the attributes of the active-experimentation model).
59. See id. at 1354-56 (stressing the importance of testing decisionmaking approaches).
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difference between the two being how actively the decisionmakers probe
for information and experiment with different policy options within the
management-problem context versus relying on modeling and
observation.60 The formal, structured decision process in both cases
involves a "setup" phase, during which an agency specifies stakeholder
involvement, management objectives, management actions, models,
and monitoring plans, followed by an "iterative" phase, during which
the agency specifies the decisionmaking process, follow-up monitoring,
assessment, and feedback.61 It is this structured decisionmaking
process that moves adaptive management beyond mere trial and error
and contingency planning. 62
B. Successful Adaptive Management in Practice
Common to both schools of adaptive management theory are
core assumptions about necessary conditions for its successful
implementation. 63 These conditions break down into two broad
categories, one having to do with the attributes of the managementproblem context and the other with the practical, political, and
normative constraints operating in the decisionmaking environment.
60. Thus the two approaches have been differentiated along the "active" versus "passive"
spectrum, with the active end using "a multistep process involving integrative ecological modeling,
conscious generation of testable scientific hypotheses, and field experimentation through carefully
tailored management interventions designed to test specific hypotheses." Karkkainen, supra note
45, at 70; see also R. Gregory et al., DeconstructingAdaptive Management: Criteriafor Applications
to Environmental Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2411, 2412 (2006) (distinguishing

between active and passive adaptive management); Byron K. Williams, Passive and Active
Adaptive Management:Approaches and an Example, 92 J. ENvTL. MGMT. 1371, 1372-74 (2011)
(distinguishing between passive and active adaptive management and providing examples).
61. See WILLIAMS & BROWN, supra note 50, at 12-16; Williams, supra note 21, at 1348-50.
62. See Karkkainen, supra note 45, at 72-74; Williams, supra note 21, at 1347.
63. See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 22, at 5-9; see also, e.g., SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR, U.S.
ORDER No. 3270 § 2 (Mar. 9, 2007), available at
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,

http://tinyurl.com/order3270:
Consideration of [adaptive management] is warranted when: (a) there are
consequential decisions to be made; (b) there is an opportunity to apply learning; (c) the
objectives of management are clear; (d) the value of reducing uncertainty is high; (e)
uncertainty can be expressed as a set of competing, testable models; and (f) an
experimental design and monitoring system can be put in place with a reasonable
expectation of reducing uncertainty.
Melinda Harm Benson has fruitfully used these conditions to examine use of adaptive
management for energy development on federal public lands. See Melinda Harm Benson, Adaptive
Management Approaches by Resource ManagementAgencies in the United States: Implicationsfor
Energy Development in the Interior West, 28 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 87, 92-104 (2010).

Our synthesis of conditions for successful adaptive management captures each of these concepts
and expands on them in several respects based on the work of other adaptive management
theorists.
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1. Management-Problem Context
Adaptive management theorists, as well as agencies practicing
adaptive management, agree that it is not well suited for all regulatory
problems. Craig Allen and Lance Gunderson, in their synthesis of the
literature on this theme, identify three key characteristics of
management problems that define how effective adaptive management
can be in application-uncertainty, controllability, and risk 64-to which
some theorists add a fourth characteristic, dynamic system.65
Uncertainty involves the decisionmaker's level of understanding and
information regarding the attributes and behavior of the regulatory
context in response to its environment as well as to management
interventions. 66 As uncertainty rises, confidence in the front-end
decisionmaking method erodes, given its "all in" bet on the agency's big
decision. Controllability turns on the degree to which the decisionmaker
can manipulate the regulatory environment.67 Higher controllability
means that decisionmakers have greater capacity to intervene in the
management-problem context and thus can engage in more
experimentation and option testing. Risk describes the chance that
experimentation and other interventions in the management-problem
context can lead to irreversible adverse consequences.68 Dynamic
system, finally, hinges on how static the management-problem context
is over time, both inherently and in response to management
interventions. 69 If a regulatory problem is dynamic rather than static,
the fundamental question is whether we know enough about the
dynamic processes (uncertainty) to manipulate them (controllability)
without messing things up (risk).
The sweet spot for using adaptive management is when a
management-problem context presents a dynamic system for which
uncertainty and controllability are high and risk is low.7 0 For example,
64. See, e.g., Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1380, 1383.
65. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 21, at 1352.
66. See Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1380 (describing uncertainty in natural
resources management contexts); Williams, supranote 21, at 1347-48 (discussing various sources
of uncertainty).
67. See Allen & Gunderson, supranote 36, at 1379-80 (describing controllability in natural
resource management contexts).
68. See id. at 1382-83 (describing risk in natural resource management contexts).
69. See Williams, supra note 21, at 1346 (emphasizing the dynamic nature of contexts
appropriate for adaptive management).
70. See Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1380, 1383 (comparing different scenarios of
uncertainty, controllability, and risk); Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information
Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455, 1467-70 (discussing the issue of uncertainty), 1477-78 (examining
controllability issues) (2011); Williams, supra note 21, at 1346 (noting that "the management
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consider an agency that has been managing a river system with
numerous water impoundments over time and is now determining how
better to manage the system for ecological values. The river and its
associated ecological resources comprise a complex dynamic system
subject to change over a spectrum of variables. There may be
considerable uncertainty regarding the effects of new management
strategies, such as releasing substantially more water from
impoundments for extended periods. But there is also considerable
control over that decision: the impoundments can be opened or closed
at will-and relatively quickly at that. With sufficient monitoring,
therefore, risk can likely be kept low by adjusting water releases in
response to detected problems before they become more serious.
The main thrust of adaptive management is to reduce
uncertainty through integrative learning fostered in a structured,
iterative decisionmaking process. This approach is most relevant for
dynamic regulatory contexts like this river-management scenario in
which uncertainty and controllability are high and risk is low. 7 1 By
contrast, if uncertainty is low, investment in learning is unnecessary; if
controllability is low, investment in learning is pointless; and if risk is
high, investment in intervention could backfire, leading to severe and
irreversible consequences. 72 Therefore, when uncertainty and
controllability are low and risk is high, investing in adaptive
management would be wasteful or even dangerous. In such situations,
the best course would be to build as much resilience as possible into the
affected social, economic, or ecological resources and respond reactively
to adverse conditions with trial and error. 73
Recognizing the factors that make adaptive management helpful
can, in some regulatory contexts, also suggest that different
decisionmaking processes are useful for different aspects of the
regulatory problem. Consider, for example, the Food and Drug
Administration's ("FDA") approval of new drugs for human use under
situation for adaptive management can be framed in terms of resources that are responsive to
management interventions but subject to uncertainties about the impacts of those interventions").
71. See Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1380, 1383 (emphasizing these purposes of
adaptive management).
72. See id. at 1380-83 (comparing scenarios); Doremus, supra note 70, at 1467 (adaptive
management "is only useful if learning is needed").
73. Allen and Gunderson build two matrices, one using uncertainty and controllability as the
axes and the other using uncertainty and risk, to allocate different decisionmaking methods to
different combinations of these three management-problem context attributes. Allen &
Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1380, 1383. In addition to adaptive management, the alternative
methods they consider are scenario planning, maximum sustained yield, build resilience, best
management practice, and nurture and triage. Id.
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the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.74 The whole point of frontend FDA screening is to ensure, to the extent possible from relatively
short-term testing, that any new drug is both safe and effective 75 (i.e.,
to minimize uncertainty and to minimize the risk before the drug enters
the stream of commerce). Such new drug approvals are thus classic
"light switch" decisions not amenable to adaptive management.
Nevertheless, as approved drugs remain on the market, new risks and
uncertainties regarding their safety can emerge-the classic problem of
drug-induced toxic torts, as demonstrated by Vioxx and thalidomide. As
uncertainty about long-term risks increases but short-term risks
remain low, the FDA's control over a drug's continued use remains
considerable, suggesting that the FDA could benefit from some sort of
adaptive management process to identify, evaluate, and respond to the
inevitable longer-term risks. In other words, where uncertainty and
controllability are high and risk is low, adaptive management has
potential advantages as a decisionmaking method, provided the
decisionmaking environment is well suited to its needs.
2. Decisionmaking Environment
In addition to describing the ideal conditions of the
management-problem context, adaptive management theorists also
have outlined a set of practical, political, and normative constraints in
the decisionmaking environment that could impede application of
adaptive management.76 To be sure, alternative decisionmaking
methods have their own sets of such constraints, and it is outside the
scope of this Article to provide a comparative analysis of the constraints
of different methods. Our purpose here is to identify the constraints in
the decisionmaking environment that point against using adaptive
management in its otherwise appropriate regulatory contexts, unless
other viable methods suffer from even more limiting constraints.
First, even in appropriate management-problem contexts, the
iterative decisionmaking style of adaptive management must be a good
fit for the practical realities of the working environment.77 In
74. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99d (2012).
75. See id. § 355(d) (describing the grounds on which the Secretary of Health and Human
Services may deny an application for a new drug).
76. For a comprehensive itemization of such constraints in their legal context, see Biber,
supra note 47 (manuscript at 6-19) (discussing problems associated with scale, time, cost, politics,
information production, institutional continuity, uncertainty, and learning).
77. See WILLIAMS & BROWN, supra note 50, at 12 (noting that there must be "a flexible
management environment that allows for changes in management as understanding accumulates
over time").
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transportation planning, for example, there is uncertainty regarding
the effects of new infrastructure options to address congestion in an
urban transit network responding to dynamic demographic and
economic trends.78 Controllability is high-a new highway or light-rail
system can be inserted into the network-and risk of irreversibly
massive failure might be assessed as low. Even so, experimenting with
highways, light-rail systems, and other large-scale, expensive, and
rather permanent infrastructure projects is simply not practical.
Transit solutions can be provided incrementally over time, as in phases
of a highway project or the addition of a light-rail system to an existing
surface road system, but the costs and disruptions of switching them
out, testing one mode here and another across town, and deciding
midstream with one mode to significantly alter its design all
substantially constrain use of adaptive management's iterative
decisionmaking process. 79 Front-end decisionmaking thus dominates
transportation planning,80 with adaptive management theory applied
more to flow-control mechanisms, such as traffic-flow detectors,
improved signage, variable tolls, and traffic light timing.81
Where iterative decisionmaking is practical given the context, it
must have a purpose. An agency charged with adaptive management
must also be charged with fulfilling or establishing clear management
goals using measurable performance metrics. 82 Adaptive management
isn't just for the kicks of making lots of decisions. In the rivermanagement scenario used above, for example, management goals
78. See Joseph Y.J. Chow et al., A Network Option Portfolio Management Framework for
Adaptive TransportationPlanning, 45 TRANSP. RES. PART A 765, 765-66 (2011) (discussing the
difficulties involved with adaptive transportation planning).
79. See WILLIAMS & BROWN, supra note 50, at 12 (noting that "an adaptive approach is not
warranted if potential improvements in management are insufficient to justify the costs of
obtaining the information needed").
80. See Chow et al., supra note 78, at 765 (arguing that "[clonventional practice in
transportation planning relies on a passive approach to project investment" in which "[e]ach
project is typically evaluated in a single long range future forecast year ... without any adaptation
to changing conditions over time").
TRANSP.
PA.
DEP'T
Control
Systems,
Adaptive
Traffic
81. See,
e.g.,
http://www.dot.state.pa.us/Portal%20Information/Traffic%2OSignal%20Portalladaptivesystems.h
tml (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (providing examples).
82. See Biber, supranote 47 (manuscript at 16-17) (discussing reasons why "clear goals are
important for an adaptive management program"); Clinton T. Moore et al., Adaptive Management
in the U.S. National Wildlife Refuge System: Science-Management Partnershipsfor Conservation
Delivery, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1395, 1396 (2011) (noting that adaptive management requires "[a]
clear statement of measurable objectives"); Susskind et al., supra note 19, at 50 (concluding from
a case study that adaptive management requires "clear goals and concrete objectives against which
progress can be measured"); Williams, supra note 21, at 1348-49 (stressing the importance of
clearly defined management goals).
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might specify achieving any or a combination of the following: restoring
natural conditions, eliminating nonnative species, improving
recreational opportunities, protecting endangered species, ensuring
continued water supply, and so on. The point is that the agency needs
firm outcome targets in order both to design management options,
monitoring programs, and assessment methods, and to evaluate
alternative management plans.
With goals in hand, the agency must also operate in an
environment that allows implementing the core features of adaptive
management. There must be technologically feasible methods available
for reliably monitoring the relevant system variables. 83 Some variables,
such as rainfall, are easy to monitor; others, such as species population
size, may not be.8 4 There must also be a set of management options that
are technologically and legally available for the agency to test and
compare so as to better inform recurring decisions.85 In the rivermanagement scenario, removal of impoundments might be an approach
worth considering as a way to improve learning, but the agency might
not have the authority to entertain that option, or, as noted above,
testing hypotheses about impoundment removal could be very
technologically and economically challenging.86 Finally, the time frame
for monitoring, testing hypotheses, and adjusting management options
must match the time frame of the system's dynamic-change
properties.87 Mismatches can create lags between adaptive
management implementation and policy-relevant time frames. If the
consequences of a management action cannot be detected for, say, a
century, the institutional opportunity to take advantage of adaptive
management in realistic policy time horizons is limited. When all of
these practical conditions are met, though, the agency is able to work
toward the core objective of the adaptive management approachreducing uncertainty about the consequences of adopting available
management options while implementing selected options.88
Practical suitability for adaptive management, however, does
not guarantee political suitability. Adaptive management is a resource83. See Doremus, supra note 70, at 1473 (stressing the importance of monitoring).
84. See id. (giving this example).
85. See Moore et al., supra note 82, at 1396 (noting that adaptive management operates
through recurrent decisions selecting from "clearly defined decision alternatives").
86. See Doremus, supra note 70, at 1484 (giving this example).
87. See id. at 1472-73 (stressing the importance of matched time frames).
88. See Moore et al., supra note 82, at 1396 (noting that adaptive management "integrates
the decision making and learning processes, so that decision making can proceed even as
uncertainty is being resolved').
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intensive decisionmaking method that relies on continuous agency
monitoring, experimentation, and assessment. 89 To be sure, the
conventional method of front-end decisionmaking burdens agency
resources as well, but most of the decisionmaking costs are front loaded.
Adaptive management, on the other hand, requires the consistent
financial support of legislative funding and agency allocation of funds
over extended time frames. This means that legislative and agencylevel leaders-in other words, policymakers-must conclude that
reducing uncertainty about the regulatory problem is sufficiently
feasible and valuable to justify the costs.90 Moreover, political support
for adaptive management must persist beyond the initial authorization
to practice it-the legislature cannot micromanage or punish agencies'
adaptive decisions and expect agencies to break out of the a/m lite
mold. 91 Of course, the agency itself also must support a culture of
adaptive management. 92 Adaptive management tolerates the
possibility that even with a robustly designed and faithfully
implemented adaptive management protocol, some experiments will
fail, and some decisions will be proven wrong. If "heads roll" when that
happens, agency personnel at the implementation level have little
incentive to move beyond a/m lite. Finally, most adaptive management
theorists include stakeholder engagement as a critical condition for
political viability of adaptive management. 93 Stakeholder engagement
allows the agency to learn from the affected community when shaping
goals and protocols and to communicate agency decisionmaking
89. See id. at 1396 (noting that adaptive management requires "[a] system of
monitoring ... in place to inform the decision maker").
90. See Biber, supra note 47 (manuscript at 8-10) (discussing problems associated with
funding and the assessment of whether the costs of adaptive management justify the gains in
reducing uncertainty); Camacho, supra note 37, at 72-74 (emphasizing the need for funding to
sustain adaptive management monitoring).
91. See Doremus, supranote 70, at 1477-78 ("[Ilnitial management steps must not become
immediately locked in, either formally by law or informally by reason of their practical effect.").
92. Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1382-83 (discussing a number of agency-culture
barriers); Susan K. Jacobson et al., Understanding Barriers to Implementation of an Adaptive
Land Management Program, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1516, 1518 (2006) (discussing a number
of agency culture barriers); Moore et al., supra note 82, at 1397 (observing that "traditions of the
[agency] can make implementation of adaptive management difficult in some settings"); Williams,
supra note 21, at 1348 (discussing a number of agency-culture barriers).
93. See Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1381 (discussing techniques of stakeholder
involvement); Williams, supranote 21, at 1348 (discussing techniques of stakeholder involvement).
Even adaptive management's enhanced use of stakeholder engagement confronts potential
obstacles in administrative law, however, as the demanding and time-consuming process
requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act could be triggered. See Melinda Harm
Benson, IntegratingAdaptive Management and Oil and Gas Developments: Existing Obstaclesand
Opportunitiesfor Reform, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,962, 10,969-71 (2009) (discussing the potential for
the Federal Advisory Committee Act to impede adaptive management).
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assumptions and rationales. To be sure, stakeholder engagement does
not necessarily equate with stakeholder support, but lack of
engagement is likely to reduce the chances of such support forming.
Even
when
the
management-problem
context
and
decisionmaking environment both point in the direction of using
adaptive management, some contexts involve highly normative
boundaries that would not allow the degree of experimentation and
decision adjustment needed to put adaptive management to work. For
example, the "dial twiddling" approach likely would offend sensibilities
in contexts such as civil rights and child labor controls. It is outside the
scope of this Article to fully inventory what policy realms involve such
normative constraints-that is largely a social and political decision.
We recognize, however, that these policy realms exist and that,
regardless of whether using adaptive management would be practicable
in the absence of the normative constraints, it may well be taken off the
table as a viable method for decisionmaking.
This is not to say that adaptive management is necessarily
inappropriate whenever strong normative principles motivate
regulatory policy. Indeed, as suggested above in the ESA context,
adaptive management can be embedded within front-end regulatory
structures to facilitate overall policy goals. Under the ESA, the
designation of a species as endangered is a binary decision that the
agency must base solely on the best available science. 94 No adaptive
management is allowed there. Such designation automatically triggers
regulatory protection of the species,95 but a permitting program allows
actions that harm the species to proceed under regulated conditions.96
During the 1990s, the ESA-administering agencies reformed that
permitting process substantially, including integrating an adaptive
management component within the permit program to manage actions
that could "pose a significant risk to the species due to significant data
or information gaps."9 7 In essence, the permit program now involves a
traditional front-end decision-whether to issue the permit, and, if so,
what should be its initial design-with an iterative decisionmaking
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2012) (defining the designation criteria).
95. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(A)-(B) (prohibiting takings of protected species).
96. Id. § 1539(a)(1). Permits under this provision are known as "incidental take permits," but
they require applicant submission of a "habitat conservation plan" and thus are also referred to as
"HCP permits." Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
97.

U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK, at add.

Executive Summary, at 1 (2000). See generally Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the
Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed.
Reg. 35,242 (June 1, 2000) (providing notice of, and reasons for, the adaptive management
revisions).
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component added for long-term management of uncertainty. Although
some commentators have accused this program of being more a/m lite
than true adaptive management, 98 it illustrates the potential for
adaptive management to work within a strongly normative and coercive
regulatory program rather than as a complete alternative to it.
The ideal policy medium for adaptive management thus exhibits
the following set of qualities:
* The management-problem context changes dynamically over
time in response to environmental conditions as well as
management interventions.
* Decisionmakers have incomplete knowledge of the
management-problem
context's
dynamic
processes
(uncertainty is high) but can manipulate various features of
the problem context through interventions (controllability is
high) without causing substantial irreversible damage (risk
is low).
* The management-problem context allows for iterative
decisionmaking.
* Decisionmakers have clear management objectives and the
methodological capacity to use experimentation, option
testing, monitoring, assessment, and learning to reduce
uncertainty and adjust management decisions in policyrelevant time frames.
* Decisionmakers have both sufficient funding and staffing
resources and the political and stakeholder support needed
to implement the adaptive management decision
methodology as designed and to adjust management
decisions based on learning.
* Implementing the adaptive management method will not
offend inviolable norms associated with the managementproblem context.
If a particular mangement-problem context does not meet these
conditions, neither we nor most adaptive management theorists would

98. See George F. Wilhere, Adaptive Management in Habitat Conservation Plans, 16
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20, 20 (2002) (contending that "few HCPs incorporate genuine adaptive
management"). Going further, Doremus et al. condemn the use of adaptive management in the
ESA permit program as "a justification for going ahead with actions that would not otherwise be
allowed." DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 22, at 6. Properly designed, however, that is what adaptive
management should provide-i.e., that if uncertainty is high, controllability is high, and risk is
low for matters within the scope of the permit, a permit integrating adaptive management to
address the uncertainty should be more likely to be approved than one that does not.
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advocate the use of adaptive management unless alternative
decisionmaking methods seem even less likely to succeed. Thus, from
the outset, we recognize and accept that adaptive management is not
appropriate for all, or even most, administrative agency
decisionmaking. Nevertheless, there is a subset of contexts where true
adaptive management would offer clear advantages over conventional
front-end decisionmaking. And there, it is worth examining how current
administrative law presents obstacles to adaptive management and
how to design new administrative law principles to facilitate use of
adaptive management in those applications. We turn now to this task.

III.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: VALUES AND OBSTACLES TO ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT

Administrative law seeks to protect a range of values, such as
due process and public participation, through procedural requirements.
The resulting body of law, however, poses significant barriers to agency
use of adaptive management. As a result, if administrative law is to
accommodate adaptive management, legislators must recognize these
barriers and adjust administrative law accordingly.99
Even within administrative law, however, some contexts need
an adaptive management track far more than others. For example, if
an agency orders third parties to engage in adaptive management as
part of a permit or license, or if adaptive management is prescribed as
part of a court settlement, then the agency should not need a general

99. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Transformingthe Means and Ends of NaturalResources
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1413-17 (2011) (describing how front-end decisionmaking has
proven a barrier to adaptive management); Ahjond S. Garmestani et al., Panarchy, Adaptive
Management, and Governance: Policy Options for Building Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1036, 1045
(2009) ("The fundamental constraint to adaptive management is the current state of
administrative law."); Alfred R. Light, Tales of the Tamiami Trail: Implementing Adaptive
Management in Everglades Restoration, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 59, 96 (2006) ("The basic
problem is that the conventional administrative law system is geared to 'command and control,'
where activity is regulated using permits that target emissions or discharges for limitation. During
the permit period, changes in the terms are not anticipated-i.e., no adaptation based on learning
by doing is allowed."); Karkkainen, supra note 45, at 73-76 (recognizing the problems of current
administrative law and proposing an adaptive management track); John H. Davidson & Thomas
Earl Geu, The Missouri River and Adaptive Management: Protecting Ecological Function and
Legal Process, 80 NEB. L. REV. 816, 859 (2001) (noting that neither administrative rulemaking nor
administrative adjudication procedures are designed for adaptive management projects). Notably,
this problem is not limited to administrative law in the United States. For example, Canadian
scholar Martin Olszynski has argued that Canadian law must provide more clearly for adaptive
management ("AM"), "failing which traditional principles of administrative law may thwart
attempts to implement AM." Martin Z.P. Olszynski, Adaptive Management in Canadian
Environmental Assessment Law: Exploring Uses and Limitations, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 1, 28
(2010).
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set of administrative procedures to engage in or supervise the specified
adaptive management. Instead, the permit, license, or settlement will
(or at least should) dictate implementation and oversight procedures,
specify monitoring criteria and requirements, provide reopener clauses,
or specify penalties for noncompliance. As such, a special adaptive
management track is most useful when an agency is seeking to use
adaptive management for its own projects or information gathering, or
for projects or information gathering done in collaboration with
nonregulated entities.
This Part reviews the key features of current administrative law
that pose obstacles to agencies' abilities to fully implement adaptive
management even in otherwise appropriate applications. These
features include requirements for public participation in agencies'
decisionmaking, the provision of judicial oversight over most agency
decisions and processes, and requirements that drive agencies toward
finality. The next Part will then examine how we can preserve these
values-albeit in modified form-in an administrative law scheme that
allows for real adaptive management.
A. Public Participation
One of the critical values enshrined in contemporary
administrative law is public participation. For example, the APA
requires federal agencies (1) in informal rulemaking to give both the
general public "notice of proposed rulemaking[s]" and any "interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking";100 (2) in
adjudications to "give all interested parties opportunity for" various
forms of participation; 10 1 (3) in the context of any agency proceeding to
give "prompt notice" to interested persons "of the denial in whole or part
of a written application, petition, or other request";102 and (4) in
receiving a petition for agency action, which can be made by any
interested person, to respond to that petition.103
A host of scholars applaud public participation in administrative
processes, and public participation is a core principle of American
administrative law theory. As administrative law literature articulates,
100. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c).
101. Id. § 554(c).
102. Id. § 555(e).
103. Id. §§ 553(e), 555(b); see also Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
794 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that "an agency 'is required to at least definitively
respond to . . . [a] petition-that is, to either deny or grant the petition' " (quoting Families for
Freedom v. Napolitano, 628 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))).
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public participation in agency decisionmaking is valuable for its own
sake,104 but it also promotes administrative legitimacy and public
acceptance, 05 encourages the agency's consideration of diverse and
divergent points of view, 06 promotes transparency in agency
decisionmaking,107 checks unbridled agency discretion, 08 and increases

104. See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court's Regulation of Civil
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1244 (2012) (noting the
importance of public participation in agency decisionmaking so decisionmakers consider a range
of different perspectives); Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law:

Building the Legal Infrastructurefor Collaborative Governance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 297, 316-17
(discussing the use of the phrase "public participation" in administrative law and the specific
processes for implementing public participation); William Funk, Public Participation and

Transparency in Administrative Law-Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV.
171, 171-72 (2009) (stating that public participation and transparency "are hallmarks of American
administrative law" and examining several statutory schemes designed to increase public
participation); Richard B. Stewart, Essay, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 444 (2003) ("Public participation through rulemaking and other
processes . . . [has] become [a] central foundation[] of administrative law practice.").
105. Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 104, at 1244; Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining
Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23 (2011); Nina A.
Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1343

(2011); Jessica Mantel, ProceduralSafeguardsfor Agency Guidance:A Source of Legitimacy for the
Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 388 (2009); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph
O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 972 (2008); Stephen M.
Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 Mo. L. REV. 695, 702-03 (2007); Stephen M. Johnson,

The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participationand Access to Government
Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 289 (1998) ("Public participation is
essential to sound agency decisionmaking because ... it instills a sense of legitimacy in the public
for the agency's decisions."); Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and

(Breach of) the Contract with America: Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying
EnvironmentalProtection?,KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 9, 12 & n.50 (1996); Keith Werhan, Delegalizing
Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 445; Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the
Administrative Open Mind, 41 DUKE L.J. 1497, 1505 (1992); Dennis Thompson, Bureaucracy and
Democracy, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE 235, 237-50 (Graeme Duncan ed., 1983);

Michael Asimow, Public Participationin the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements,
75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 529, 574 (1977); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative
Proceedings,81 YALE L.J. 359, 381 (1972).
106. Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 104, at 1244; Funk, supra note 104, at 179-80;
Stewart, supra note 104, at 1713-15; Jim Rossi, ParticipationRun Amok: The Costs of Mass
Participationfor DeliberativeAgency Decisionmaking,92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 187 (1997); KENNETH
CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 424 (3d ed. 1994); Peter D.
Holmes, ParadisePostponed: Suspensions of Agency Rules, 65 N.C. L. REV. 645, 688 (1987); Barry

Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of
Citizen Suits Under FederalEnvironmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 843-44 (1985).
107. Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
831, 877 (2012) ("By forcing agencies to incorporate public participation into their decisionmaking
processes, the APA renders agency decisions more transparent and better informed."); Bingham,
supra note 104, at 334-41; Funk, supra note 104, at 171-72.
108. Watts, supra note 105, at 36; Stewart, supra note 104, at 1715-18; Ann Bray, Comment,

Scientific Decision Making: A Barrierto Citizen Participationin Environmental Agency Decision
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the amount of information available to decisionmakers, including
information regarding the regulated entities' and general public's
preferences.109

Adaptive management threatens, or at least is perceived to
threaten, the promotion of public participation in traditional
administrative law. One possible response to this objection is that
administrative law theory has increasingly criticized extensive public
participation requirements because they create burdensome
inefficiency in agency decisionmaking,1x0 a criticism resonant with the
impediments that administrative law creates for true adaptive
management. We do not, however, rest our promotion of adaptive
management on the devaluation of public participation in agency
decisionmaking; we admit, moreover, that there is a fundamental
tension between continual public deliberative debate over an agency's
action and that agency's commitment to principled adaptive
management over time. But the inescapable trade-off is that "the blackletter law . .. constrains how far agencies can go with a/m-lite, as truly
iterative 'learning while doing' may at some point run afoul of . .. the

demands of public notice and comment."11 ' In natural resources law, for
example, "environmental protection interests are concerned that
[adaptive management] will lead to closed-door resource development
approvals." 12 Moreover, public participation in some prominent
environmental adoptions of adaptive management, such as for Habitat

Making, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1991); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

266-68 (1978).
109. Tran, supra note 107, at 877; Mendelson, supranote 105, at 1344-46; Watts, supra note
105, at 62; Mantel, supra note 105, at 388; Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 105, at 972; Rossi,
supra note 106, at 186-87; Holmes, supra note 106, at 688.
110. Mantel, supranote 105, at 388-89. See generallyDavid L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using
Empirical Research to Design Government Citizen Participation Processes: A Case Study of
Citizens' Roles in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2008)
(empirically assessing the role of public participation in administrative law); Rossi, supra note 106
(exploring the idea that public participation can overwhelm agency processes); Edward Rubin, The
Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (2005)
(exploring the limits of traditional models of administrative process, including public
participation); Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and PoliticalReview of Agency
Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2001) (same); Mark Seidenfeld, supra note 12, at 483-84 (same); Mark
Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000) (same); Stewart, supra note 104 (same); Mark
Seidenfeld, supra note 12, at 483-84 (same); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor
the BureaucraticState, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1541 (1992) ("[The problem today is not a lack of
responsiveness to popular interests, but rather an overresponsiveness to immediate and fickle
political whims and to powerful factions. . . .").
111. Ruhl & Fischman, supranote 6, at 480.
112. Id. at 478.
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Conservation Plans under the ESA, has been limited and subject to
demands for greater public input. 113
This tension, nevertheless, can be resolved by aligning public
participation requirements and opportunities with the structured
decisionmaking process that adaptive management demands, achieving
a balance between public participation and agency effectiveness. As
Jessica Mantel has pointed out in a different context,
A vigorous administrative state that efficiently and effectively serves the public interest
is jeopardized by excessive procedural requirements that consume significant agency
resources and unnecessarily delay agency action. Accordingly, preserving the ability of
government officials to meet society's needs depends on reaching a delicate balance
between administrative processes that advance the legitimacy of the regulatory state
while preserving its effectiveness. The challenge, then, is to construct administrative
processes . . . that strike this balance.

1 14

As we discussed in Part II, adaptive management theorists
already encourage stakeholder participation in the setup phase of
adaptive management, and this setup phase lends itself well to
traditional modes of public participation in agency decisionmaking,
especially informal rulemaking. Moreover, while direct public
participation must be constrained in the iterative implementation
phase of adaptive management if true adaptive agency decisionmaking
is to be allowed, the law can easily accommodate transparency concerns
by requiring agencies to regularly produce public reports on their
implementation "dial twiddling" and to publicly publish monitoring
results at regular intervals. Finally, the iterative structure of adaptive
management-if coupled with a "reset button" requirement that
agencies periodically return to the setup phase (as we propose
below)11 5-provides
parallel iterative opportunities for public
participation. Moreover, this public participation would be enhanced in
subsequent decisionmaking rounds by the availability of agency reports
and the accumulation of monitoring data. In other words, adaptive
management readily lends itself to direct public participation in the
agency's periodic "big decisions"-the defining and redefining of specific
management goals and the periodic evaluation and reevaluation of
management measures employed-even as it requires administrative
law to carve out space for a certain amount of discretionary
implementation in between. The design issue posed, of course, is how
113. Id. at 479-80.
114. Mantel, supra note 105, at 389. See also Peter A. Pfohl, CongressionalReview of Agency
Rulemaking: The 104th Congress and the Salvage Timber Directive, 14 J.L. & POL. 1, 25-26 (1998)
(discussing how Congress achieved this same kind of balance in the distinction between noticeand-comment rulemaking and rulemaking exempt from these procedural requirements).
115. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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far to spread apart those "big decisions" (or "reset buttons"), which we
deal with below. 116
B. JudicialReview
The availability of judicial review is one of the hallmarks of
contemporary administrative law in the United States.117 Indeed,
historically, judicial review was one of the procedural safeguards that
allowed the U.S. Supreme Court to bless the administrative state as
constitutional, despite the lack of mention of administrative agencies in
the U.S. Constitution and despite their engagement in adjudications.118
Judicial review advances several important values in
administrative law. Most obviously, it ensures that agencies comply
with congressional dictates and hence oversees exercises of agency
discretion.119 Scholars also laud judicial review for its ability to prevent
agencies from being "captured" by regulated entities contrary to the
broader public interestl 20 and to promote reasoned and reasonable

116. See generally infra Part I.B.
117. Stewart, supra note 104, at 444; Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative

Proxies for JudicialReview: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
313, 314, 320-21 (2013).
118. E.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,
450 (1977) (holding that Congress could create a new cause of action in the government for civil
penalties under the Occupational Safety and Health Act enforceable in an administrative agency
where there is no jury trial).

119. Carrie Leonetti, Watching the Hen House: JudicialRulemaking and JudicialReview, 91
NEB. L. REV. 72, 117 (2012); Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of JudicialReview on Agency
Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1724 (2012); Jack M.
Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 12 (2011);

Watts, supra note 105, at 38; Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative
Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2008); Robert L. Glicksman, Securing Judicial Review of Agency
Inaction (andAction) in the Wake of Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, in STRATEGIES
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE 163, 169 (Michael Allen Wolf

ed., 2005); Lisa Schultz Bressman, JudicialReview ofAgency Inaction:An ArbitrarinessApproach,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1687-89 (2004); Stewart, supra note 104, at 1669-70, 1673-76; STEPHEN
G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES
985 (5th ed. 2002); Steven P. Croley, State Administrative Law Reform: Recent Experience in
Michigan, 8 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 347, 396-97 (1999); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Critique of Active

Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 634 (1997);
Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency InactionAfter Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 668

(1985); Philip J. Harter, The PoliticalLegitimacy and JudicialReview of ConsensualRules, 32 AM.
U. L. REV. 471, 485-86 (1983); Richard J. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Politicaland JudicialReview
of Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1981).
120. Wagner, supra note 119, at 1717-24; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 (1985).
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agency decisionmaking.121 Finally, judicial review provides another
route for promoting transparent agency decisionmaking and public
participation in agency processes. 122
Nevertheless, judicial review as currently constituted imposes
two primary barriers to effective adaptive management. First,
regardless of the standard used, the very availability of judicial review
for each final agency decision is too intrusive, threatening agencies'
authority and practical ability to adjust adaptive management projects
and management measures as they learn without being immediately
hauled into court for every little dial adjustment. Admittedly, review
pursuant to the APA and most other statutes is limited to "final agency
action," 123 suggesting that some minor agency "dial twiddling" might be
exempt from judicial review even under current law, especially if courts
were to classify adaptive management decisions as being "committed to
agency discretion." However, as the U.S. Supreme Court recently
confirmed, actions that a federal agency considers tentative,
preliminary, or experimental may nonetheless be considered "final,"
especially if the decision concludes an agency determination of some
sort or creates legal consequences. 124 Moreover, the very fact that there
is litigation challenging iterative-phase decisions still disrupts the
structured adaptive management decisionmaking process-even if the
agency eventually prevails.
Second, current standards for judicial review do not match the
process of adaptive management. For example, agencies must
demonstrate that their decisions are reasonable (not arbitrary and
capricious) attempts to fulfill statutory mandates and goals. However,
a recent comprehensive study of how courts have treated agency
attempts to employ adaptive management in natural resources law
concluded that "adaptive management procedures, no matter how finely
crafted, cannot substitute for showing that a plan will meet the
substantive management criteria required by law." 2 5 On the other

121. Hammond & Markell, supra note 117, at 121; Wagner, supra note 119, at 1723-24.;

Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., "HistoryBelongs to the Winners": The Bazelon-Levanthal Debate and
the ContinuingRelevance of the Process/SubstanceDichotomy in JudicialReview ofAgency Action,
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1009 (2006); Croley, supra note 119, at 396-97; Susannah T. French,

Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litigation, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 944
(1993); LOUIs L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 601 (1965).

122. Matthew Groves, Should We Follow the Gospel of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial
Review) Act 1977 (CTH)?, 34 MELB. U. L. REV. 736, 760 (2010).
123. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
124. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371-72, 1374 (2012) (citations omitted).
125. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 445.
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hand, the study also revealed a judicial receptiveness to adaptive
management in theory, concluding that
regardless of the particular outcome of judicial review, courts generally wish to support
the trend toward adaptive management .... Courts sometimes explicitly state that they
do not wish to create disincentives for using adaptive management .

. .

. It is fair to

conclude from this litigation that courts, despite their roots in the conventional
administrative law model of a phase change at the time of final agency action, generally
give agencies wide berth within statutory constraints to alter traditional planning
approaches to accommodate adaptive management. 126

Thus, when administrative law itself can accommodate adaptive
management, the courts will also try to support its use.
Nevertheless, the fact that courts generally support adaptive
management in natural resources law does not prevent them from
overturning agency attempts to employ adaptive management,
particularly when the courts are not convinced that the agency's
adaptive management plan will achieve substantive statutory
requirements.1 2 7 Moreover, under current principles of administrative
law, it is difficult for courts to "directly distinguish legitimate adaptive
management from imposters."128 One reason is that no legislation
requires an agency to adhere to legitimate adaptive management
methodology, leaving courts with inappropriate procedural
requirements against which to judge an agency's invocation of adaptive
management. 29 For example, as much as adaptive management theory
advocates that agencies "design[] management actions as experiments
so that they promote learning to reduce uncertainty," the reality is that
"this crucial element of adaptive management is not generally required
by law and courts will not impose it."130

C. Finality
One of the entrenched values of contemporary administrative
law is finality-the insistence on final resolutions by administrative
agencies that will be definitively upheld or rejected by the courts. Thus,
for example, while "agency action" subject to the APA includes a broad
126. Id. at 446-47.
127. Id. at 461-70.
128. Id. at 470.
129. As Ruhl and Fischman observe, "a court upholding an alm-lite approach does not
necessarily endorse the practice as advancing the goals of either law or conservation policy. It
simply means that the use of alm-lite did not run afoul of any specific legal requirement or
substitute for a required finding or procedure." Id. at 446. Moreover, "courts may approve agency
actions that involve terrible applications of adaptive management." Id.
130. Id. at 471.
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range of agency activities-"the whole or a part of an agency rule, order,
license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to
act"131 - reviewable agency actions are limited to those "made
reviewable by statute and final agency actionfor which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court." 132 More generally, nonfinal agency action
is of no legal effect, a fact that the U.S. Supreme Court recently
underscored in its evaluation of administrative compliance orders.133
Investments in up-front decisionmaking, and hence an agency's
drive toward finality, are only increased when its actions are subject to
additional requirements for regulatory impact analyses beyond the
basic explanations that the APA's (or state equivalent's) "arbitrary and
capricious" standard would require. Regulatory impact analyses can be
legion, especially for federal agencies, but two of the most intensive are
environmental-impact analyses134 and cost-benefit/risk-benefit/riskrisk analyses.135
Of course, valuing finality in administrative law reflects the
American legal system's more pervasive valuation of finality
undergirding a variety of legal doctrines. As Dan Tarlock has
summarized,
We follow Hume and Bentham and seek to confirm settled expectations unless there is a
compelling overriding reason, usually one grounded in constitutionally protected norms
such as free expression or racial equality. Once a decision is rendered, we expect parties
to forever abide by the outcome. Finality takes many forms. Sometimes, it is represented
by express doctrines and legislation, such as res judicata,statutes of limitation, and the
doctrine of vested rights. On other occasions, finality is implicit. For example, the premise
behind an environmental impact statement is that once environmental damage has been

131. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012).
132. Id. § 704 (emphasis added).
133. See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371-74 (2012) (holding that EPA administrative
compliance orders issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act are final agency actions subject to
judicial review largely because those orders do have immediate legal effects).
134. E.g., National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (requiring federal
agencies to produce environmental-impact statements "in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment"); California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA'), CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 21000, 21002 (2012) (explaining California's environmental-impact report requirements); New
York State Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"), N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8 (2012)
(explaining New York's environmental-impact statement requirements). For a discussion of how
these statutes can each inhibit adaptive management and promote adaptive management, see
Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 472-75.
135. E.g., Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg.
3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (reaffirming the requirement of cost-benefit analyses for regulatory actions);
Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993)
(requiring that agencies perform a cost-benefit analysis in determining whether and how to
regulate).
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fully disclosed, a one-time decision can be made on the merits of the activity, and even if
the activity will irrevocably alter the environment, the decision is legitimate and final. 136

The point here is not that finality is bad per se, but rather that
the many procedural drivers toward finality in administrative law-the
extensive requirements for front-end justification to produce a judicially
defensible final agency action-effectively end further deliberation and
debate over the agency's decision, both publicly and within the
agency. 137 As such, they act as barriers to full agency implementation
of true adaptive management.
Indeed, because administrative law drives agencies toward
finality, that body of law has little place for continual agency
experimentation and adaptation, as adaptive management requires. 138
Instead, it both assumes and reifies a world where agency decisions are,
most essentially, onetime and isolated events, not a continually
evolving series of refinements-or, as adaptive management scholars
have put it, "toggle" choices rather than "dial" adjustments. 139
This characterization is perhaps most obvious for agency
adjudications-permitting, licensing, certification, and other decisions
that apply laws to the actions of one or a discrete collection of
individuals or entities. Rules, in contrast, are by definition amenable to
amendment and replacement over time, 140 allowing for some agency
learning and adjustment. Nevertheless, under contemporary
administrative law, each rulemaking effort-even the amendment or
136. A. Dan Tarlock, The NonequilibriumParadigm in Ecology and the PartialUnravelingof
Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1140 (1994) (emphasis added).
137. As Ruhl and Fischman have explained:
[F]inal agency action [is the step] when the government throws the switch and makes
the decision it will implement and defend if challenged in court. The legal system
regards the point of final agency action as a phase change when the fluid period of
deliberation ends and implementation/defense of a fixed record and plan of action
begins.
Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 436-37 (citing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 419-20 (1971)).
138. As Susskind and Secunda have noted:
Adaptive management theory treats almost all governmental interactions as
experiments, from which we can continuously learn what works and what does not.
Adaptive management envisions a continuous process of institutional transformation,
as entities "evolve" their philosophies and strategies through continuous assessment
and improvement. Change is driven by a constant flow of information gathered via
purposeful experimentation.
Susskind & Secunda, supra note 18, at 157.
139. See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 438 ('The legal view of a resource management
plan is that it comprehensively evaluates all rational considerations at once and then flips a toggle
switch; the adaptive management approach twiddles the dial as information trickles in.").
140. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012) (defining "rule making" to include not only the initial
promulgation of a rule but also the processes of amending and repealing rules).
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modification of a prior rule-is evaluated as a separate legal event, not
an ongoing process of agency learning and adaptation. Indeed, the
courts have debated the degree of deference to which a federal agency
is entitled when it amends a regulation, 141 one indication that
amendments are separate legal events rather than part of an ongoing
agency decisionmaking process. In essence, the agency is supposed to
"get it right" at each pronouncement and to "keep it right" until new
information or changed circumstances justifies a change. There is very
little room, even under the arbitrary and capricious standard, for an
agency to say honestly, "We have only a vague idea now of how to
achieve what we want to achieve, but we think this decision is a good
start for now." 142
In contrast, adaptive management allows-even demandscontinual managerial flexibility in the face of system complexity. 143 In
the realm of ecology and natural resources management, for example,
adaptive management "was originally the domain of scientists
frustrated with policy makers' failure to grasp the complexity of the
natural world." 144 Ecosystems, of course, are one of the paradigmatic
complex systems-in the words of C.S. Holling, "complex, nonlinear
systems where discontinuous behavior and structural change are the
norm."145
Nevertheless, while ecologists rejected an equilibrium paradigm
for ecosystems decades ago, environmental law has not caught up. 14 6 As
Dan Tarlock, among other scholars, has recognized, "The major
institutional change necessitated by the nonequilibrium paradigm is
the need to apply adaptive management to biodiversity protection." 147
However, as he also has recognized, "The idea that all management is
141. E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991) (explaining that an agency "must be
given ample latitude 'to adapt [its] rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances.'"
(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983))).
142. See Tarlock, supra note 136, at 1141-44 (describing the difficulties agencies encountered
when trying to implement adaptive management).
143. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 424.
144. Wiersema, supra note 47, at 1245.
145. C.S. Holling, What Barriers?What Bridges?, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL
OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 3, 19 (Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 1995); see also Ruhl &

Fischman, supra note 6, at 428-31 (describing the evolution of views in natural resources policy).
146. See Tarlock, supra note 136, at 1122-23, 1125-30 (discussing the flaws of the equilibrium
approach and the failure of policy makers to notice the scientific shift away from it); see also Ruhl
& Fischman, supra note 6, at 424-27 (arguing that, while adaptive management "has become
infused into the natural resources policy world to the point of ubiquity, surfacing in everything
from mundane agency permits to grand presidential proclamations," agencies are actually
practicing "aim lite" and courts do not support robust adaptive management).
147. Tarlock, supra note 136, at 1139.
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an ongoing experiment poses a profound challenge to our legal system
because it undermines a core principle of procedural and substantive
fairness: finality." 148 The demand in administrative law for immediate
finality again thus acts as a barrier to agency implementation of true
adaptive management.
D. A New Approach to Administrative Law
Annacoos Wiersema has summarized the new governance
literature from a variety of disciplines:
[W]e live in a complex society where laws designed for particular purposes can have
unanticipated consequences, where bureaucracy is too slow and cumbersome to respond
quickly and efficiently enough to those consequences, and where the traditional structure
of top-down lawmaking is under siege as too rigid, too hierarchical, and too contentious
to achieve its goals. The world we live in, as legal writers spanning a range of fields tell
us, requires new forms of governance. 149

Administrative law in particular has already evolved several times to
accommodate changing values and to fix perceived problems.
Nevertheless, administrative law has not yet evolved to embrace
instances when agencies truly need additional kinds of flexibility.
Notably, however, when Congress and the courts fully appreciate the
need for ongoing federal agency flexibility and nimbleness in the face of
changing circumstances, they exempt the agency from APA
requirements. One prominent example is the Federal Reserve
Board's150 open market decisions, which include its determinations of
interest rates and discount rates. Specifically, the Federal Reserve
System's Federal Open Market Committee ("FOMC") "sets the federal
funds rate at a level it believes will foster financial and monetary
conditions consistent with achieving its monetary policy objectives, and
it adjusts that target in line with evolving economic developments." 15 1
Thus, although its decisionmaking process is rarely labeled as such, the
FOMC engages in a form of continual adaptive management with the
goal of maintaining economic stability in the face of complex and

148. Id. at 1140.
149. Wiersema, supra note 47, at 1241 (footnotes omitted).
150. Congress created the Federal Reserve System in 1913 through the Federal Reserve Act.
Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). The "Federal Reserve Board," for purposes of this discussion, is more properly named the
Federal Open Market Committee, which "oversees open market operations" and "influence[s]
overall monetary and credit conditions." BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 3 (9th ed. 2005), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf-complete.pdf.
151. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 150, at 16.
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changing economic realities. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court
classified the FOMC's open market (domestic policy) decisions as
interagency memoranda that are generally exempt from APA
procedural requirements, 152 while Congress provided special
procedures for those decisions. 153 Finally, the federal courts have
refused judicial oversight of these FOMC decisions. 154 As Judge
Augustus Hand, writing for himself, Judge Learned Hand, and Judge
Swan, once explained:
It would be an unthinkable burden on any banking system if its open market sales and
discount rates were to be subject to judicial review. Indeed, the correction of discount rates
by judicial decree seems almost grotesque, when we remember that conditions in the
money market often change from hour to hour, and the disease would ordinarily be long
15 5
over before a judicial diagnosis could be made.

Thus, U.S. administrative law is no stranger to differentiated
procedural requirements-including dramatically increased agency
discretion-that reflect the reality that regulatory contexts vary. More
specifically, Congress, through the administrative laws it has passed,
already acknowledges that some such contexts require rapid
adjustments to changing circumstances in order to achieve higher-level
legislative and regulatory goals. Adaptive management could be one of
the most valuable of the new governance tools to deal with the
complexity and uncertainty of the contemporary world-a world that is
subject to, among other things, continual and emerging stresses from
phenomena such as climate change and rippling global economic
crashes.15 6 Nevertheless, as Brad Karkkainen suggested as early as
152. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1979).
153. 12 U.S.C. §§ 247a, 263(b)-(c) (2012). The U.S. Supreme Court summarized the FOMC's
procedures as follows:
The FOMC meets approximately once a month to review the overall state of the
economy and consider the appropriate course of monetary and open market policy. The
Committee's principal conclusions are embodied in a statement called the Domestic
Policy Directive. The Directive summarizes the economic and monetary background of
the FOMC's deliberations and indicates in general terms whether the Committee
wishes to follow an expansionary, deflationary, or unchanged monetary policy in the
period ahead. The Committee also attempts to agree on specific tolerance ranges for the
growth in the money supply and for the federal funds rate.
Merrill, 443 U.S. at 344-45.
154. E.g., Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 766 F.2d 538,
543-44 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (affirming the dismissal of a lawsuit challenging the FOMC's decisions on
standing and separation of powers grounds).
155. Raichle v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 34 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1929).
156. In the natural-resources-management context, for example, Professor Barbara Cosens
has published pioneering work on the need for adaptive management as a tool for increasing
resilience and coping with both system complexity and climate change. See, e.g., Barbara Cosens,
Resilience and Law as a Theoretical Backdrop for Natural Resource Management: Flood
Management in the Columbia River Basin, 42 ENVTL. L. 241, 252 (2012) (footnote omitted)
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2005,157 adaptive management requires a different form of
administrative law. The next Part thus proposes a different vision of
the law governing agencies and describes the contexts in which
adaptive management would be valuable.
IV. ADDING AN ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT TRACK TO ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW
To the extent that agencies have been attempting to implement
adaptive management, they generally do so at the limits of their
administrative discretion. 158 While an agency's desire to push the limits
of its discretion to achieve a better regulatory or management program
might be understandable, such stretching renders federal agencies
vulnerable to "abuse of discretion" litigation, 159 and in some states it is
flatly illegal.160 Indeed, concerns over agency discretion-and
("Resilience scholars call on adaptive management to allow adjustment to the high degree of
uncertainty associated with the complex interactions and feedbacks in a social-ecological system,
an approach that would be necessary as nonstructural measures are implemented and their true
impact measured."); Barbara Cosens, TransboundaryRiver Governance in the Faceof Uncertainty:
Resilience Theory and the Columbia River Treaty, 30 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 229, 263
(2010):
[While existing frameworks for agency management are appropriate for management
and adaptive management in the face of predictable variability, the existing framework
may not be appropriate for response in a complex system in which uncertainty is "not
reducible by further research," or . . . to "wicked" problems in which the actors are
unable to agree on either the problem definition or the solution.
See also Camacho, supra note 99, at 1415-16 (noting that "scholars and agencies increasingly
endorse the incorporation of adaptive management to cope with the uncertainty likely to arise with
climate change"); Camacho, supra note 37, at 10-13 (advocating more generally for adaptive
governance).
157. Professor Karkkainen wrote:
One might even envision administrative law proceeding on two tracks: ordinarily the
familiar "fixed rule" track will apply, except in circumstances where the agency can
justify, according to well-understood standards, shifting to the adaptive management
track, and at that point a second set of adaptive management administrative law
principles would kick in, requiring different procedures and further justifications for
changes in the course of action.
Karkkainen, supra note 45, at 75. Professor Karkkainen did not, however, actually propose such
a statute. See also Ruhl, supra note 10, at 54 (suggesting that we are a long way from having a
National Adaptive Management Act).
158. See Susskind & Secunda, supra note 18, at 166 (noting that the "EPA's uneasiness
regarding the use of its administrative discretion undermined Project XL from its inception").
159. E.g., ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1994) (holding that the
National Labor Relations Board's decision to award reinstatement and back pay was not an abuse
of discretion despite the employee's false testimony).
160. See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Pan Am. Constr. Co., 338 So. 2d 1291, 1293-94 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976) (holding that an agency cannot, by rule, expand its statutory authority), appeal
dismissed, 345 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1977).

2014]

ADMIN LAW & ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

41

mechanisms to constrain that discretion-have been a substantial focus
in administrative law from its creation. 161 Given adaptive
management's value for the administrative toolbox, it would be far
better to provide agencies with explicit statutory authority to engage in
authority that simultaneously addresses the
itl62-statutory
administrative law barriers to adaptive management identified in Part
III. This Part begins by examining how an administrative law scheme
that promotes adaptive management could simultaneously preserve
and promote traditional administrative law values. It then examines
what other features are necessary both to ensure that agencies engage
in true adaptive management, not a/m lite, and to provide procedural
safeguards against ineffective or damaging adaptive management
experiments.163
A. PreservingTraditionalAdministrative Law Values in the Adaptive
Management Process
Redesigning administrative law to allow for adaptive
management does not require abandoning traditional administrative
law values-quite the opposite. Indeed, commentators on adaptive
management have identified public participation to be a critical
component of any adaptive management scheme. In particular, they
advocate public participation at critical stages of the project or
management measure, 164 access to judicial review, 165 and provision for
some sort of emergency outside intervention if the project or
management measure's implementation of adaptive management goes
too far awry or actively undermines the substantive goals of the

161. Stewart, supranote 14, at 1676-82.
162. See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 480-81 ("Only Congress can let agencies break out
of the a/m-lite mold without fear of public, industry, and judicial pushback."); Susskind & Secunda,
supra note 18, at 166 (arguing for "passage of legislation specifically defining and authorizing
[EPA's Project XL] implementation," which "would minimize the need for agency staff to squeeze
XL experiments under the umbrella of tortured regulatory reinterpretation").
163. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind et al., CollaborativePlanningand Adaptive Management in
Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (2010) (arguing that "[a]fter thirteen
years and millions of dollars, the [Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Program] has failed to
stabilize or otherwise improve the quality of the fragile downstream ecosystem").
164. See Susskind & Secunda, supranote 18, at 162-63, 164 (arguing that stakeholders should
be encouraged to participate in individual projects and proposals, and suggesting the creation of a
funding mechanism to help stakeholders lacking sufficient resources to participate).
165. Id. at 166 (arguing that "any affected party [should have statutory right to] petition to
have the [EPA] project[s] stopped immediately in federal court").
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regulatory regime. 166 Incorporating safeguard mechanisms such as
these will support the legitimacy of adaptive management processes,
without which adaptive management is doomed; 167 the challenge will
be not to smother adaptive management in the process.
Finality is, perhaps obviously, the traditional administrative
law value most in tension with adaptive management. Even here,
however, we can accommodate traditional values, given that
commentators expect visible progress toward, if not achievement of,
stated goals within a reasonable period of timel 68 -"reasonable" being
judged by the management project's scale. In other words, we should
judge finality in this context not by the administrative process itself,
but rather by the goals that the adaptive management project is trying
to achieve.
The key to preserving these administrative law values while
allowing agencies to implement true adaptive management is for
administrative law to embrace and absorb adaptive management's
periodicity. Specifically, we should recast administrative procedure not
as a one-time, final-agency-decision-then-judicial-review process, but
rather as a recurring process of punctuated "final" decisionmaking,
public participation, and judicial review somewhat akin to continuing
jurisdiction in the courts. Reenvisioned in this light, administrative law
can actually better hold agencies accountable to their adaptive
management responsibilities while simultaneously providing for more
public participation and judicial oversight than the current a/m lite
compromise allows.
1. Public Participation
While, as noted above, traditional administrative law provisions
governing public participation are generally considered a barrier to
agency use of true adaptive management,169 it is worth emphasizing
166. See id. at 165-66 (arguing that proposed legislation allowing for adaptive management
in environmental compliance through Project XL should provide that "EPA and/or a state
environmental authority can unilaterally order the experiment to cease").
167. See Barbara A. Cosens, Legitimacy, Adaptation, and Resilience in Ecosystem
Management, 18 ECOLOGY & SoC'Y, no. 1, 2013, at art. 3, availableat http://www.ecologyandsociety
.org/vol18/iss1/art31 (examining theories of legitimacy in the context of adaptive management).
168. See, e.g., Susskind et al., supra note 163, at 4-5 (explicitly expecting progress toward
ecological improvement after thirteen years of adaptive management efforts in Glen Canyon).
169. At this point, it is necessary to distinguish agency-based adaptive management, which is
what this Article focuses on, from collaborativeadaptive management, which purposely involves
stakeholders in every aspect of adaptive management decisionmaking. Public participation-or,
more precisely, stakeholder participation-is far broader and more continuous in collaborative
adaptive management. As a result, additional procedures are recommended to prevent the
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again that many proponents of adaptive management deem public
participation to be critical to the project's success.170 Thus, the issue of
public participation in agency adaptive management should not be
framed in terms of whether the public gets to participate in the agency's
decisionmaking, but rather when. Public input for every agency
adjustment to an adaptive management project or management plan
would undermine the agency's ability to implement the lessons it learns
in real time and bog down the implementation of adaptive management
in the various processes of public participation (notice and comment,
collaborative decisionmaking, judicial review), potentially derailing the
whole project. As a result, in administrative law terms, these
adjustments to a preexisting adaptive management plan should not be
considered agency "actions" that trigger public participation
requirements.
Nevertheless, formulation of the plan itself is clearly an adaptive
management moment that lends itself to public input. Similarly,
adaptive management's requirement that agencies engage in periodic
evaluations of their progress toward preidentified goals, and hence that
they periodically comprehensively adjust the management measures
that they are employing, provides additional perfect moments for
recurring, rather than continual, public participation.
By focusing on adaptive management as an iterative process,
amendments to administrative law that insist that agencies engage in
proper adaptive management, rather than a/m lite, could actually
increase public participation in adaptive management exercises by
providing multiple (but punctuated) opportunities for public
involvement as the project evolves over time. Rather than forcing
agencies who implement adaptive management (or, rather, a/m lite) to
delineate the full range of administrative discretion all at once,
reformed procedures would require agencies to periodically evaluate
and adjust their adaptive management projects and management
measures, subject to public notice and comment. The length of the
period between comprehensive reevaluations could vary by context, but
in most cases should be no longer than five years. In between, the
agency's implementation of its adaptive management plan would be,
essentially, "hands off'-although public reporting requirements at

collaboration from bogging down or from becoming dominated by one perspective. See Susskind et
al., supra note 163, at 30-54 (discussing these procedural "best practices" in the context of the
Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Program).
170. See Susskind & Secunda, supra note 18, at 162-63, 164 (arguing that "ongoing and
meaningful" participation by all relevant stakeholders was critical to the improvement and success
of the EPA's Project XL).
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regular intervals could both facilitate continual public monitoring and
provide a basis for emergency intervention.
2. Judicial Review
As with public participation, the question regarding judicial
review of agency adaptive management is not a question of whether
there should be judicial review, but rather when. In current APA terms,
not every agency action in an adaptive management project should be
considered "final agency action" subject to judicial review. "Dial
adjustments" in accordance with an adaptive management plan that
has itself been subject to judicial review do not, themselves, need to be
subject to further judicial review.
As a result, the availability of judicial review of adaptive
management should largely track the availability of public
participation. Judicial review thus would be cyclical, generally
available only during the project-review phase and as part of the
formulation of the next plan. In other words, judicial review should be
available after the agency has summarized and reviewed its monitoring
data and formulated-subject to public notice and public
participation-its adaptive management plan for the next cycle of
implementation. Review of the adaptive management plan would be
based on existing standards of administrative judicial review:
conformance with administrative procedural requirements; compliance
with substantive statutory requirements (especially with respect to
management goals); compliance with prior monitoring plans; and the
reasonableness of the new adaptive management plan in light of prior
monitoring, best available science, or other relevant data and overall
management goals.
Of course, there is always the possibility that an agency's
implementation of its adaptive management plan will go horribly awry.
It may just be, for example, that despite the agency's "best guess" at
how to proceed, the complex system does not respond as expectedindeed, it may instead respond in a way that puts the entire system at
risk. Alternatively, emergency or unforeseen circumstances may render
an agency's existing adaptive management plan moot or futile. For
example, the 2008 housing and financial crisis changed various aspects
of the real estate, banking, and securities systems throughout the world
and was deemed by many to warrant emergency intervention. 171 In the
171. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of
Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765, 852-68 (2012) (assessing
causes of the financial crisis including failures in regulation); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE
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realm of natural resources management, in contrast, climate change is
likely to increasingly require the overhaul of overall management goals
for particular species and ecosystems. 172 Finally, as in any
administrative law context, the agency may simply fail to do any of
what it is supposed to be doing, effectively abandoning its adaptive
management plan.
As a result, the administrative law governing agency adaptive
management needs an "escape valve"-a means of allowing outside
intervention (most likely in the form of a judicial injunction) or an
abrupt change of course within the agency itself when adaptive
management projects are going badly awry or when unforeseen
emergencies arise. Of course, if not tightly controlled, this escape valve
runs the risk of undermining the basic purpose of designing a special
administrative law for adaptive management by allowing discontented
litigants to challenge the agency's implementation of its adaptive
management plan at any point in the implementation period. 173 To
avoid this outcome, legislatures should enact strict criteria for
emergency intervention, especially for outsider challenges in court, and
make it clear in the statute itself that these criteria are to be strictly
construed againstcourt intervention. Formulating strict standards that
can still apply broadly to a variety of different types of agencies, though,
will be difficult, regardless of the care in drafting. Hence, a heavy
burden of proof (either beyond a reasonable doubt or clear and
convincing evidence) and strict standard for judicial action (strict
scrutiny) can best effectuate the goal of keeping the opportunity for
emergency intervention narrow. Nevertheless, out of deference to the
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPOFCIC/pdflGPO-FCIC.pdf (same); Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1352 (2011) (same); Manuel A.
Utset, Complex FinancialInstitutionsand Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REV. 779 (2011) (same).
172. See, e.g., Susskind et al., supranote 163, at 28 (noting that, in the Glen Canyon system,
"[t]he precarious state of the downriver ecology is particularly disconcerting because anticipated
stressors, such as climate change, are likely to strain the ecosystem even further" and that studies
indicate that the Colorado River and its reservoirs could dry up entirely by 2057); see also Mark

Squillace & Alexander Hood, NEPA, Climate Change, and Public Lands Decision Making, 42
ENVTL. L. 469, 474 (2012) (proposing that adaptive management become a required approach
under NEPA as a result of climate change); Rhett B. Larson, Innovation and International

Commons: The Case of Desalination Under International Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 759, 800
("Adaptive management has become a central feature of climate change policy debates, as
policymakers must respond to a changing environment and a better understanding of climate
change through improved modeling."); Craig, supra note 49, at 15, 17, 39, 65-67 (repeatedly
positing adaptive management as a salutary tool for climate change adaptation).
173. For example, Susskind et al. have described the debilitating effects of continual legal
challenges to the Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Program. Susskind et al., supra note 163,
at 26-27.
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agency's expertise, slightly less stringent criteria should apply to the
agency's own determination that it needs to change course. Again,
however, the statutory presumption should be against abandoning the
current adaptive management plan midcourse unless there are clear
and convincing reasons for doing so.
3. Finality
Unlike traditional agency decisionmaking in rulemaking and
adjudication, adaptive management decisionmaking by its very nature
is not-or at least not immediately-final. The question, therefore, is
how to balance adaptive management's fluidity and flexibility with the
law's demand for some sense of finality. As a practical matter,
"[a]daptive management cannot, of course, be constantly changing; it is
public regulation that must satisfy constitutional requirements of
substantive and procedural due process." 174 These concerns are
particularly acute when an agency's implementation of adaptive
management affects not just its own direct regulatory or management
actions but also the conditions and requirements imposed on regulated
entities. 75 Conversely, adaptive management does not lend itself to the
one-time "final finality" that is the goal of both administrative process
and American law more generally. 176
Fortunately, adaptive management readily lends itself to
periodic "reset points." Specifically, adaptive management is already
conceived of as an iterative process where progress depends on these
reflective "pause points" that allow or require the managing entityhere, the administrative agency-to evaluate past actions and reassess
its future course. These pause points provide apt moments for the public
processes of administrative law to intervene in an ongoing process of
adaptive management, satisfying needs for temporary certainty
regarding the agency's next course of action as well as allowing for
meaningful public participation and judicial review.
It is important to recognize, however, that adaptive
management temporally separates two aspects of agency finality that
are generally united in front-end, binary agency decisionmaking. The
first aspect of finality is the completion of the decisionmaking process
itself-the end of a rulemaking, the order in an agency adjudication, the
174. Tarlock, supra note 136, at 1141; see also Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 478
(acknowledging "that the scope of adaptive management is not boundless").
175. See Ruhi & Fischman, supra note 6, at 477 ("Private regulated interests have expressed
concerns about the capacity of adaptive management to add continually to the conditions imposed
by resource development authorizations without the security of finality.").
176. See id. at 429 (describing adaptive management as evolutionary and iterative).
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final decree in court after the last possibility of appeal has expired.
Administrative law for adaptive management preserves this sense of
finality by focusing on each round of the agency's adaptive management
plan as a legally final "event": absent the emergencies described above,
at the end of the judicial review period, the adaptive management plan
will govern the management measure or project at issue for the time
period designated-generally one to five years, but perhaps longer for
larger and more complex management activities.
However, by definition, each iteration of an adaptive
management plan probably will not be the substantively final
implementation of overall legislative intent or policy goals, which
compose the second aspect of finality in agencies' traditional decisions.
When the FDA decides to approve a new drug for human use, it has
definitively decided-at least based on the evidence currently
available-that the drug meets the substantive-law requirements for
efficacy and safety. When the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers decides to
dredge a harbor, it has definitively decided that the dredging will
advance the Rivers and Harbors Act's goal of improving navigation.
Indeed, this alignment of the agency's final decision and the statute's
substantive goals is the basis of arbitrary and capricious review in
administrative law.
Judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard,
however, has always suggested that there is a lurking issue in much
agency decisionmaking regarding how confident an agency has to be
that its proposed implementation of a statute will actually accomplish
what the agency thinks it will and hence advance the legislature's
overall goals and purposes. For example, under the federal Magnuson.
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,177 regional
Fishery Management Councils must establish measures designed to
recover a "depleted" fishery,178 and these measures often include fishing
quotas. The U.S. Court of Appeals found unreasonable a fishing quota
that had only an 18% chance of recovering the relevant fishery,
commenting that "[o]nly in Superman Comics' Bizarro world, where
reality is turned upside down, could the Service reasonably conclude
that a measure that is at least four times as likely to fail as to succeed
offers a 'fairly high level of confidence.' "179 More generally, clashes over
this "confidence" issue may be one indication that adaptive
management may be a better course for the agency decisions at issue.

177. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-83 (2012).
178. See id. § 1851(a)(1) (requiring measures to prevent overfishing).
179. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

48

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1:1

A special legal track for adaptive management would therefore
be more transparent than current administrative law regarding the
agency's ability to meet (and its process for achieving) legislative goals,
at least to the extent that the adaptive management plans required in
the proposed new track lay bare the agency's degree of uncertainty
regarding specific management measures and its plans for actively
improving the efficacy of its management "best guesses." Nevertheless,
substantive finality (or at least the illusion of substantive finality) is
purposely put off until some point in the future, if it can be "finally final"
at all. This poses two implications for administrative law. First, as will
be discussed in the next Section, administrative law for adaptive
management needs to provide a procedure whereby an agency can take
a project off the adaptive management track-most likely because the
agency has resolved, through trial and error, all or most of the
uncertainties that were making management difficult, in situations
where continual change is not a complicating factor. Second, in judicial
review of adaptive management plans, arbitrary and capricious review
cannot be based on the agency's certainty of achieving overall
management goals in the next round of implementation. Instead,
judicial review should evaluate the reasonableness of the adaptive
management plan in making progress toward those overall
management goals in terms of resolving recognized uncertainties in the
management problem, improving basic information regarding the
system's function and complexity, and measuring ongoing changes to
the system.
In other words, an adaptive management plan should be judged
adequately "final" if it proposes a well-defined and reasonable
experiment that will result in progress-theory confirmation or
falsification, increased knowledge of basic system features that are
relevant to the management objective, and so on-toward the overall
legislative goal. And, indeed, this is how most advocates of adaptive
management think about finality in this context.180 Administrative law
can further the improved use of adaptive management by doing the
same.
B. DesigningAdministrative Law Specifically for Adaptive
Management
Beyond the traditional
commentators who have argued

administrative
law values,
for experiments in adaptive

180. See, e.g., Susskind et al., supra note 163, at 24-25 (evaluating the Glen Canyon Adaptive
Management Program in terms of progress toward its announced goals).
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management have agreed that certain features are critical. These
features should be incorporated into any legislation explicitly allowing
for adaptive management. They include (1) criteria for defining what
sorts of projects or management measures qualify for the special
legislation; 81 (2) definition of project or management-measure goals
and their relative priorities; 182 and (3) objective monitoring of the
implementing
adaptive
management
measure
project
or
management,183 with progress measured against concrete standards.184
To achieve the goal of allowing agencies to engage in true adaptive
management, moreover, agency decisionmaking following the adaptive
management track should generally be free of additional external
procedural requirements.185 In the federal system, these include the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and its requirement for
an Environmental Impact Statement; 86 the ESA's "jeopardy"
consultations and habitat conservation plan requirements;' 8 7 and
multiple rounds of regulatory impact analyses, including cost-benefit
analyses. Finally, the new administrative procedures should allow
agencies to end the adaptive management process when the agency's
implementation measures achieve stable results that meet a
predetermined goal or when it becomes clear that adaptive
management is not working. This Section describes in turn each of
these features of the proposed new Model Adaptive Management
Procedure Act ("MAMPA").

181. See Susskind & Secunda, supra note 18, at 166 (suggesting five criteria for proposed
projects).
182. Ruh1 & Fischman, supra note 6, at 424, 472, 482; see also COMM. ON ENDANGERED &
THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, supra note 20, at 332-335; cf. Susskind et al.,
supra note 163, at 6, 25 (criticizing the lack of clearly stated goals for the Glen Canyon Dam
project).
183. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 424; see also COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED
FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, supra note 20, at 332-35; Susskind & Secunda, supra note
18, at 166, 169, 170.
184. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 482; see also COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED
FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, supra note 20, at 332-35; Susskind & Secunda, supra note
18, at 164-65, 170 (advocating the use of ISO environmental management standards as a
benchmark for assessing the success of Project XL adaptive management proposals and arguing
that continuous evaluation is "crucial").
185. See, e.g., Schultz & Nie, supra note 38, at 444 (noting that compliance with other
procedural requirements, especially NEPA, poses a real challenge to implementing adaptive
management).
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012) (requiring all federal agencies to produce environmentalimpact reports for major federal actions).
187. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a), 1539(a) (requiring federal agencies to consult with the Secretary
of the Interior or Secretary of Commerce regarding projects that could jeopardize endangered
species and allowing the Secretary to take actions necessary to maintain populations).
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1. Getting on the Adaptive Management Track: Three Pathways
Establishing an alternative set of administrative law procedures
for adaptive management-what we have been calling the adaptive
management track-necessarily creates the issue of how to determine
whether an agency can use the alternative track for a particular
decisionmaking process. This question, in turn, depends upon whether
the relevant legislature has specified what the agency is to do or
whether the choice is the agency's own, resulting in three potential
situations regarding the agency's ability to use the adaptive
management track. Section 2 of the MVAMPA addresses these three
situations.
First, the legislature might definitively require an agency to use
adaptive management for a specific management context or set of
management decisions. Second, and conversely, the legislature might
expressly forbid an agency from using adaptive management for
particular kinds of decisions or for any decision. In either of these two
cases, the legislature's pronouncement would be final, and the roles of
the agency and courts in evaluating the propriety of the adaptive
management track would be minimal, particularly when the legislature
has expressed itself clearly.
Third, the legislature might leave the choice of whether to use
the adaptive management track to the agency, either expressly or
through statutory silence on the issue. We generally deem statutory
silence and express statutory delegation of the decision to choose the
adaptive management track to the agency as legally equivalent, which
both (1) pragmatically avoids requiring the legislature to amend all
prior statutes to address the adaptive management possibility before
an agency can opt into the adaptive management track and
(2) acknowledges agencies' potentially greater expertise regarding the
issue of when adaptive management would be desirable and
appropriate substantively and contextually. However, we also
acknowledge that requiring the legislature to give the agency express
permission to use the adaptive management track would eliminate
several threshold legal issues, such as evaluating whether adaptive
management is appropriate for the management project at issue, an
option that states in particular might find attractive.
When an agency has the option of deciding whether to pursue
the adaptive management track, the MAMPA requires the agency to
make a positive decision to do so through standard notice-and-comment
(informal) rulemaking. In so doing, the IAMPA constructs standard
administrative procedures as the default rule: federal agencies, for
example, would follow the APA unless Congress clearly instructs
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otherwise or Congress has allowed the agency the choice (or is silent on
the issue) and the agency decides to pursue the adaptive management
track. This default preserves administrative law's status quo and hence
minimizes overall disruption when a legislature decides to introduce
the adaptive management track. The default rule also reflects our sense
that use of the adaptive management track will in fact be less frequent
and less appropriate than use of standard administrative procedures in
most agency decisionmaking.
In making a decision to use the adaptive management track, the
agency must demonstrate, based on "the best evidence available," that
the project or management activity at issue is appropriate for adaptive
management, using the factors and considerations that we identified in
Part II. The "best evidence available" standard is intended to prevent
courts from requiring agencies to have perfect information regarding
the suitability of adaptive management, while the factors are intended
to ensure that the agency can nevertheless demonstrate a good fit
between the project or management activity and the basic goals and
constraints of adaptive management.
As specified in Section 6 of the IVIAMPA, the agency's decision to
use the adaptive management track, expressed in a final rule, is
judicially reviewable but subject to a ninety-day statute of limitations.
The short statute of limitations limits the time delay between an
agency's decision to use adaptive management and its ability to actually
begin the adaptive management process if there are no challenges to
the propriety of its decision. If judicial review is sought, however, the
reviewing court (we propose for federal agencies the U.S. Courts of
Appeals) can assess both the legislature's intent regarding adaptive
management and the propriety-under standard arbitrary and
capricious review-of the agency's decision to use adaptive
management for the particular project or management activity at issue.
Judicial review for alleged procedural and constitutional violations is
also available.
Finally, an agency's decision to use the adaptive management
track would be subject to all other applicable procedural and evaluative
requirements that would normally apply to agency rulemaking under
the appropriate state or federal laws. For federal agencies, for example,
the agency's initial decision to use the adaptive management track
could thus be subject to various cost-benefit analyses' 88 and review by
188. E.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1532, 1535 (2012) (requiring costbenefit analyses for rulemaking resulting in spending of $100 million or more in the government
and private sectors in a given year and requiring consideration of reasonable alternatives).
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the Office of Management and Budget, 89 various regulatory-impact
analyses,190 environmental impact assessment requirements under
NEPA, 19 or consultation requirements under the ESA.192 Subjecting
the agency's decision to these traditional requirements both reflects the
MAMPA's provision that normal administrative law procedures remain
the default set of requirements and ensures at the outset that the
agency's decision to change procedural tracks will not in and of itself
violate existing statutory and executive limitations on agency actions.
2. Formulating the Initial Adaptive Management Plan: Goals,
Monitoring, and Standards
Once an agency's project or management action, or category of
projects or management actions, is subject to the adaptive management
track, the first step is for the agency to adopt its initial adaptive
management plan. Section 3 of the MAMPA addresses this step.
- In order to avoid the re-creation of a/m lite, the MAMPA subjects
agencies to a rigorous planning requirement that details the necessary
elements of true adaptive management. First, as adaptive management
theory demands, the agency must identify specific management goals
and objectives, both for the system overall and for its initial
management measures. These goals and objectives provide the overall
measures against which both the agency and the courts can measure
progress in the adaptive management process.
Second, the agency must identify, to the extent possible,
potential threats to its management goals and potential stressors and
perturbations to the managed system. Identifying these threats,
stressors, and perturbations from the beginning will help the agency to
define and adjust its management measures. Doing so can also help to
define potential events that might require abrupt changes in the
189. E.g., Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept.
30, 1993) (requiring federal agencies engaged in "significant" regulatory action to submit their
proposed rules to the Office of Management and Budget for review).
190. E.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (2012) (requiring a federal agency to
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis of any rule subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements under the APA or any other statute unless the agency certifies that the rule will not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities); Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, Exec. Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov.
6, 2000) (requiring federal agencies to develop an accountable process to ensure "meaningful and
timely input by tribal officials in the development of regulatory policies that have tribal
implications"); Federalism, Exec. Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (requiring
federal agencies to develop an accountable process to ensure "meaningful and timely input by State
and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism implications").
191. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
192. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2012).
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agency's adaptive management plan or that might even render the
system no longer amenable to adaptive management in general.
Third, the agency must identify relevant indicators in the
system, both generally and for this round's monitoring plan. Indicators
are the system components that the agency will monitor throughout the
adaptive management process to gauge its progress toward its
management goals. As a result, the indicators chosen must give the
agency an ability to comprehensively and meaningfully assess the
system and how it is changing in light of the management objectives.
Fourth, the agency must develop a monitoring plan. The
monitoring plan must be defensible under the best practices of the
professional discipline most relevant to the project or management
action (for example, a forest-management action would turn to biology).
It must also use a standardized and accepted methodology that the
agency implements consistently so that the agency can compare the
resulting data over time. In addition, the agency must provide for the
periodic release of monitoring data to the general public in a
comprehensible and usable form. The MA1VIPA suggests that such
public reports on the agency's activities be spaced no more than six
months apart, although we acknowledge that longer or shorter periods
might be appropriate for different kinds of agency activities. The
legislature, of course, remains free to specify different times for
different agency management situations.
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, the agency must identify
in its initial adaptive management plan changes in indicator statuses
that are relevant to evaluating its progress toward the identified
management objectives.193 Specifically, the agency must describe
changes in the indicators that would suggest that either the system is
moving in a positive direction (i.e., toward achieving management
goals) or that the system is moving in a negative direction. As part of
this process, the agency must also identify means by which it can
determine whether the changes in the indicators are in fact caused by
its management measures or by other factors (or some combination).
Finally, the agency should identify changes in system indicators,
individually and collectively, so negative that they counsel in favor of
aborting the current management plan. These "abort indicators" will
become the primary measures through which either the agency can
justify abrupt changes in its adaptive management plan or the general

193. See Schultz & Nie, supra note 38, at 444-45, 455-64, 469-91 (advocating the use of
"triggers" in agency implementation in adaptive management for reasons similar to those that
prompt us to require the agency to specify various criteria for evaluating its actions and for
aborting current management activities).
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public can justify emergency intervention; they also provide one
measure through which the agency can reassess whether adaptive
management was an appropriate decisionmaking process in the first
place.
The agency adopts its initial adaptive management plan-and
every subsequent adaptive management plan-through notice-andcomment rulemaking. As such, the process of formulating each adaptive
management plan is subject to public notice, comment, and hearings
when appropriate, just as under traditional administrative law. The
MAMPA expands upon this traditional public participation, however,
by requiring that the agency also actively invite more public
involvement in the plan's formulation through representatives of
interest groups and stakeholders. The requirement, specifically, is that
the agency make reasonable efforts to involve and accommodate these
groups. However, the Act also leaves the agency with considerable
discretion to limit the number of participants to a level that will be both
manageable and helpful. The intention, as adaptive management
theory recommends, is for agencies to involve interested stakeholders,
through their representatives, in plan formulation earlier in the process
than standard notice-and-comment rulemaking would allow.
The agency's initial adaptive management plan is subject to
fairly standard judicial review, but with two innovations to current APA
requirements. First, judicial review is subject to a short (thirty-day)
statute of limitations. This short window is intended both to recognize
that increased stakeholder participation in the planning process will
ideally eliminate many conflicts, reducing the need for extensive
judicial review, and to encourage stakeholders and the interested public
to keep a close eye on agency adaptive management efforts. Second,
courts engaged in judicial review of agency adaptive management plans
now have, through the MAMPA's section 3 requirements, a substantial
structural guide for ensuring that agencies are engaged in "proper"
adaptive management, because failure to include or adequately explain
any required plan element would be grounds for remanding the entire
plan to the agency. In other words, the 1VIAMPA teaches courts how
agencies should be implementing proper adaptive management.
One final aspect of the procedures for the initial adaptive
management plan is worth noting. The MAMPA generally exempts
agency adaptive management plans from the substantive and
procedural requirements of any statutes, regulations, or executive
orders other than the statute that authorized the agency to engage in
the relevant management activities in the first place (but, as explained
above, not the initial decision to choose the adaptive management
track). As such, once an agency is on the adaptive management track,
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it is free from confining and occasionally derailing ongoing procedural
requirements-including but not limited to NEPA environmental
analysis requirements, ESA consultation requirements, and OMB
review and associated cost-benefit analysis requirements-unless the
agency's authorizing statute provides otherwise. This exemption is
intended to provide agencies with an incentive for engaging in the
rigorous process
of adaptive management planning and
implementation. Notably, however, nothing in the MAMPA prohibits
agencies from following these requirements voluntarily, and the
relevant legislature can always specifically require continued
compliance for particular agency adaptive management processes.
3. The Implementation Phase and Emergency Interventions
In one of its most important innovations for administrative
procedure, the MAMPA specifies that once an agency is actually
implementing an adaptive management plan, no judicial review of its
interim decisions is available unless emergency intervention is
appropriate. In more traditional administrative law terms, the
implementation phase is considered "committed to agency discretion by
law," with limited exceptions. The MAMPA underscores this
commitment to agency discretion by specifying that, in general,
challengers will not be entitled to their costs or to attorney fee awards
in lawsuits filed during the implementation period even if they are
successful, removing one incentive for implementation period litigation.
As has been discussed, this freedom from judicial review during the
implementation phase is necessary for true adaptive management to
occur. However, the elimination of judicial review that the MAMPA
provides also offers agencies an additional incentive for using the
adaptive management track when it is appropriate.
The general unreviewability of the implementation phase under
the MAMPA gives agencies considerable discretion to pursue adaptive
management, correcting one of the most important limitations of
conventional administrative law for adaptive management.
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that this increase in agency discretion
will make many people and interest groups uncomfortable.194 To
194. See id. at 444; see also Neil Green Nylen, Note, To Achieve Biodiversity Goals, the New
Forest Service PlanningRule Needs Effective Mandates for Best Available Science and Adaptive
Management, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241, 245 n.22 (2011) ("This need to balance structure with
discretion is an across-the-board concern in administrative law." (citation omitted)). Notably,
however, Emily Hammond and Dave Markell have recently examined how agencies can legitimize
their behavior even in the absence of judicial review-what they term "legitimacy from the insideout." See generally Hammond & Markell, supra note 117. This Article accepts their premise that
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mitigate this discomfort while still providing agencies with what we
consider necessary additional discretion, the AIVI PA provides
mechanisms whereby interested members of the public can keep an eye
on what the agency is doing during the implementation phase and can
intervene in true emergencies or if the agency has completely
abandoned the project. First, the agency must provide the general
public with its monitoring data in an understandable and usable form
at least every six months. Second, the agency must report to the general
public at least once per year regarding how it is implementing its
adaptive management plan (including adjustments that it has made to
its management measures). If the agency fails to provide monitoring
data or required reports within two months of their due dates, members
of the public can sue for the limited purpose of compelling production.
Third, either members of the public or the agency itself can abort the
current adaptive management plan under two circumstances: (1) the
system achieves the abort indicator statuses designated in the
management plan; or (2) an unanticipated severe disturbance occurs in
the system, such as an unanticipated natural disaster, economic
collapse, or act of war or terrorism. Finally, if the agency clearly and
completely abandons its adaptive management plan (as narrowly
defined in the MAMPA's judicial review provisions in section 6),
members of the public can sue the agency to compel compliance or to
force the agency to formally abandon the adaptive management track.
However, if the court dismisses any such lawsuit because the agency
actually is acting, the agency is entitled to its costs and attorney fees.
This provision of 1VIAMPA is intended to underscore the narrowly
tailored nature of the "abandonment" cause of action.
As part of their adaptive management plans, agencies must
identify abort indicators (MAMPA sections 3(B), 4(B)). Abort indicators
are a specified set of monitored statuses that, if they occur either
collectively or individually, signal to the agency that its management
measures are taking the system grossly off any path toward achieving
its management goals. During the planning-period rulemaking, the
agency must explain and justify the abort indicators it chooses, and
these abort indicators are subject to judicial review. As a result,
achievement of the abort indicators should signal to both the agency
and the general public that the current adaptive management plan
should be terminated-unless, as the MAMPA makes clear, the agency
can attribute those indicator statuses to the occurrence of an
agency legitimacy can exist even in the absence of judicial review, and we have structured our
vision of agency adaptive management plans to help build such legitimacy during the
implementation phase, despite increased agency discretion.
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unexpected and temporary perturbation to the system whose effects are
not expected to be permanent or long lasting.
Under sections 3(C)(1), 4(C)(1), and 5(B) of the MAMPA, if the
abort indicators are achieved, the agency can terminate the
management plan simply by giving notice in the Federal Register (or
the state equivalent) and waiting thirty days; no rulemaking is required
for termination, although it will be required for the new adaptive
management plan, which is subject to the provisions of section 4.
Alternatively, under section 5(D), members of the public can file a
mandamus action in federal district court or the designated state court
(subject to any jurisdictional limitations such as standing and the
traditional requirements and limitations governing mandamus). Both
the agency, if its decision is challenged as allowed in section 6, and
mandamus petitioners must prove the case for termination by clear and
convincing evidence, an evidentiary standard imposed to better ensure
that termination is in fact warranted. Mandamus petitioners are also
subject to additional procedural requirements to ensure that such court
actions are rare and do not interfere with the agency's own decision to
terminate.
Given that the agency must identify "expected" conditions for
termination of the adaptive management plan through the abort
indicators, we purposely designed the MAMPA's provision for "true"
emergency termination in sections 5(C) and 5(E) to be extremely
limited; moreover, the statute instructs the courts to narrowly interpret
these provisions. To terminate agency implementation because of an
emergency, either the agency or members of the public petitioning for
mandamus must show that (1) a severe disturbance to the system
occurred, (2) the adaptive management plan did not anticipate the
disturbance, and (3) the disturbance fundamentally altered the
information or system status that formed the basis of the adaptive
management plan. Again, the agency can terminate its implementation
merely by publishing notice in the Federal Register and waiting thirty
days, but its decision is subject to judicial review under section 6. In
addition, again, both the agency (if its decision is challenged) and the
mandamus petitioners must prove their cases by clear and convincing
evidence, and mandamus petitioners are subject to additional
requirements intended to limit their ability to interfere with the
agency's own decisionmaking.
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4. Resetting at the Pause Point: Review, Evaluation, and the Next
Round of Adaptive Management
The agency's implementation of its current adaptive
management plan will eventually end, at which point the agency
proceeds to the steps of evaluating the data gathered, reviewing its
management options, and proposing a new adaptive management plan
for the next round of management-measure implementation. The
MAMPA envisions three "natural" termination triggers for ending the
implementation period, spelled out in sections 3(C) and 4(C). First, as
discussed in the previous Section, the agency should terminate its
adaptive management plan when the system achieves the abort
indicators. Second, and conversely, the system might achieve the plan's
"finished indicators." Like the abort indicators, finished indicators are
specific statuses identified in the adaptive management plan that the
monitored indicators might achieve during the course of the
implementation period. However, unlike abort indicators, finished
indicators are signals that the agency's current management measures
have done their job-assuming that no other cause explains their
achievement-and that it is time for the agency to make additional
progress toward its ultimate management goals. Third, the
implementation period might end simply as a result of the passage of
time. In the absence of an express, legislatively imposed time limit on
the implementation period, the IVAMPA requires the agency to choose
and justify an appropriate length of time as part of the adaptive
management plan, and that time limit would govern termination.
However, the MAMPA also imposes a default outer limit of five years
for any implementation period.
Through section 4, the MAMPA presumes that the agency will
continue through successive rounds of adaptive management plans.
The agency adopts subsequent plans, like the first, through notice-andcomment rulemaking, subject to the same additional public
participation requirements, substantive plan-component requirements,
and judicial review. However, after the first round of implementing
adaptive management, the agency must also (1) explain what it has
learned about managing the system, both in the immediately previous
implementation period and over the entire adaptive management
process; (2) adopt new management measures based on that evaluation;
and (3) explain any and all changes to the adaptive management plan
based on new information, changes to the system or its components, or
changes to the law that the agency is implementing.
Once the agency adopts a new adaptive management plan (and
survives any judicial review), it proceeds into a new implementation
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period. It continues through rounds of planning and -implementation
until it has reason and the legal ability to remove the project,
management action, or category of projects or management actions,
from the adaptive management track.
5. Getting Off the Adaptive Management Track Once on It
Some agency management situations may be so subject to
continual change that there is no reason for the agency to ever take its
management action off the adaptive management track. In these
situations, adaptive management becomes the single best means of
managing the system. Public lands managers, for example, may well
find that perpetual adaptive management best enables them to cope
with the continual and escalating impacts of climate change on the
relevant ecosystems. And, as we have already discussed, the Federal
Reserve (although outside the standard administrative law system) is
effectively perpetually pursuing adaptive management with respect to
interest rates.
For other management situations, though, the initial problems,
as
lack of basic information about the system or how it responds
such
to various management measures, can actually be solved through
adaptive management, allowing the agency to stabilize both the system
and its management activities. At that point, the agency may find that
the adaptive management track is no longer necessary or helpful.
Alternatively, after a few rounds of adaptive management, the
agency may find that the system or the management problem is not,
after all, amenable to adaptive management. If it was the agency that
decided to pursue the adaptive management track in the first place, and
it has made a good faith effort to use adaptive management, albeit to
little avail, it should have the option to remove its project or activity
from the adaptive management track.
Section 4 of the MAMPA outlines four situations in which
leaving the adaptive management track is appropriate. First, Congress
or the relevant state legislature may have intervened since the agency
began its adaptive management process and ordered the agency to take
its project or management action off the adaptive management track.
Agencies must, of course, comply with these new legislative mandates.
Second, even if Congress or the state legislature required the
agency to use adaptive management, it may also have specified when
the agency would be "done." If the agency's adaptively refined
management measures have achieved the legislative criteria for leaving
the adaptive management track, the agency can-and possibly mustdo so.
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Third, even when an agency chose the adaptive management
track, it may be able to identify clear criteria for when the adaptive
management process would have stably achieved all management
goals. If the adaptive management process brings the agency to the
point where its management measures meet these criteria, and if the
agency can now stably manage the system and maintain the applicable
management goals, it may conclude that the adaptive management
track has served its purpose and that it can now operate effectively
through traditional front-loaded administrative rulemaking and
planning. The MAMPA allows agencies in this situation to leave the
adaptive management track.
Finally, an agency that initially showed that its management
situation fit the criteria in section 2 of the MAMPA for entering the
adaptive management track may find that, in reality, adaptive
management is not working after all. The IVIAMPA effectively requires
that the agency make a good faith effort at using adaptive management.
However, if the agency can show that (1) its reasonable management
measures repeatedly take the system to the point where the abort
indicators are achieved, (2) the system has changed significantly since
the agency decided to pursue the adaptive management track, or
(3) new information gathered in the process of adaptive management
significantly undermines the agency's initial conclusion that adaptive
management is appropriate, then the agency can leave the adaptive
management track.
Section 4(A) of the IVIAMPA requires the agency to make and
justify through notice-and-comment rulemaking its decision to take a
project or management action off the adaptive management track. The
final rule is subject to fairly standard judicial review requirements.
V. CONCLUSION
For two reasons, experiments with adaptive management in the
field have thus far failed to live up to the promise of adaptive
management in theory. One is that adaptive management is not a good
fit for many, or even most, policy management problems. The first wave
of adaptive management scholarship was perhaps too optimistic in this
regard, offering up adaptive management as a panacea to the
intractability of front-end-style agency decisionmaking without
carefully thinking through its own limitations. Swept up in this
euphoria, policy managers may have applied adaptive management too
aggressively and in ill-suited contexts, thus setting it up for failure.
More recently, however, these lessons learned have led to a
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reexamination of adaptive management theory to refine the contextual,
practical, and normative conditions under which its use is appropriate.
Accepting those conditions as the new starting point for applying
adaptive management, we have examined the second reason for
adaptive management failure-the front-end-focused requirements of
conventional administrative procedure. Adaptive management and
conventional administrative procedure form a classic square-peg,
round-hole mismatch that has captured the attention of many adaptive
management theorists. The now widely held perception is that three
deeply rooted values of administrative procedure-public participation,
judicial review, and finality-combine in conventional administrative
law to erect a nearly impenetrable barrier to effective adaptive
management. These values are perfectly appropriate for administrative
procedure, and we do not propose abandoning them to make adaptive
management possible. However, neither do . we believe adaptive
management must be stuck forever in a/m lite mode in order to preserve
administrative procedure's values. Rather, we follow through on
suggestions that we and others have made for a specialized adaptive
management track in administrative procedure that balances the needs
of adaptive management with the values of administrative law.
Our proposed adaptive management track is the first detailed
blueprint for a new legal structure to match adaptive management's
decisionmaking structure. Recognizing that some tradeoffs are
inevitable, we have sought to retain the core values of administrative
law to the maximum extent possible in a procedural framework that
allows agencies to engage in true adaptive management. However, to
avoid a/m lite, we have simultaneously designed this new track to help
ensure that agencies apply adaptive management effectively and only
in appropriate settings. Finally, the adaptive management track's
processes, standards, and requirements should actively educate judges
and the public as to how adaptive management can be as rigorous and
transparent as traditional agency decisionmaking.
We have made some tough decisions regarding how to redesign
administrative law for adaptive management, and some of our choices
may spark debate. We welcome that debate, because we consider our
proposed Model Adaptive Management Procedure Act to be an opensource work in progress and have every expectation that it can and will
be improved. Indeed, we hope we have persuaded all adaptive
management theorists and practitioners and all administrative law
theorists and practitioners that they have a stake in the project of
designing administrative law for adaptive management, and we hope
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they will consider this Article an invitation to take our blueprint to their
drawing boards for more work.19 5

195. We are pleased to be part of a process with that goal in mind, an interdisciplinary
workshop effort spearheaded by Professor Barbara Cosens of the University of Idaho and Professor
Lance Gunderson of Emory University that has received generous funding from the University of
Maryland's Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center (SESYNC).
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Section 1: Definitions
(A) "Abort indicators" means indicator statuses identified by the
agency in compliance with §§ 3(B)(3)(h) and (5)(d) of this Act
(and as made applicable to § 4(B)) and which signal that the
agency should terminate immediately its current
management measures.
(B) "Adaptive management" means a decisionmaking process
based on the structured and iterative implementation of
management measures, with comprehensive monitoring of
relevant system indicators, in the attempt to achieve specific
management goals or objectives, reduce uncertainty, or
increase knowledge about the system that an agency is
charged with managing.
(C) "Adaptive management plan," when used without
qualification, refers to an agency plan adopted pursuant to
either § 3 or § 4 of this Act.
(D) "Adaptive management track" or "adaptive management
procedure track" means the agency procedures and
requirements established in Sections 2 through 6 of this Act.
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(E)

"Administrative Procedure Act" or "APA" means 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559, 701-706. [States would substitute the
appropriate statute and definition.]

(F)

"Agency" means each authority of the Government of the
United States [State of __J, whether or not it is subject to
review by another agency, but does not include:
(1)

the President [Governor];

(2)

the Congress [legislature];

(3)

the courts of the United States or the states;

(4)

the governments of the territories or possessions of the
United States;

(5)

the government of the District of Columbia.

(G) "Complex system" or "system" means a policy-management
context in which the relevant social, economic, technological,
biological, physical, and environmental components are
numerous, diverse, and interrelated; exhibit feedback
between each other as conditions change; and adapt to
stressors, perturbations, and management measures over
time, based at least in part on how other components within
the policy-management context respond.
(H) "Finished indicators" means the indicator statuses identified
by the agency in compliance with §§ 3(B)(3)(i) and (5)(D) of
this Act (and as made applicable in § 4(B)) and which identify
system responses that have met the goals for the agency's
current implementation of management measures.
(I)

"Implementation period" means the period in which the
agency is implementing an adaptive management plan.

(J) "Management action" or "agency management action" refers
to larger-scale agency activity, the purpose of which is to
guide a system toward the agency's or legislation's overall
management objectives or goals for the system.
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(K) "Management measure" means any specific or smaller-scale
agency action taken as part of a management action in order
to gather information about the system generally or a system
component, test the system's response to a proposed
management action, pursue immediate management
objectives for the system or one of its components, or reduce
risks to or uncertainties about the system or one of its
components.
(L)

"Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or public or private organization other than an
agency.

(1VI)

"Perturbation" means an event that disrupts the number,
diversity, interrelations, feedback mechanisms, and
adaptive capacities of the components of a complex system.

(N)

"Project" or "agency project" means a specific agency activity
that redesigns, physically alters, or rearranges some or all of
the components of a system.

(0)

"Rule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or
describing the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency. "Rule" includes an agency's
initial decision to follow the adaptive management track and
all adaptive management plans.

(P) "Rulemaking" means the agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule.
(Q)

"Stressor" means a social, economic, technological, biological,
physical, or environmental condition that acts over time to
disrupt the number, diversity, interrelations, feedback
mechanisms, or adaptive capacities of the components of a
complex system.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

66

[Vol. 6 7:1: 1

Section 2: Agency Projects and Management Actions Subject to
the Adaptive Management Procedure Track
(A)

Unless one of the sets of circumstances described below in
subsections (C) or (D) is met, an agency must follow the
normally applicable procedures of the Administrative
Procedure Act [state equivalent statute] for the project or
management action or category of projects or management
actions at issue. However, if the requirements of subsections
(C) or (D) are met, this Act supersedes the Administrative
Procedure Act [state equivalent statute] for the project,
management action, or category of projects or management
actions made subject to this Act.

(B)

No agency may follow the adaptive management track
created by this Act if Congress [the legislature] has
prohibited the use of that track in the legislation authorizing
the agency to implement or engage in the project or
management action or category of projects or management
actions at issue.

(C) An agency must follow the adaptive management track
created by this Act if Congress [the legislature] has expressly
required the agency to follow that adaptive management
track with respect to the project or management action or
category of projects or management actions at issue.
(D)

An agency may follow the adaptive management track
created by this Act with respect to a specific project or
specific management action, or a category of projects or
management actions, if:
(1)

Congress [The legislature] has not prohibited the use of
the adaptive management track with respect to the
specific project, management action, or category of
projects or management actions; and

(2)

the agency finds, on the basis of the best evidence
available, that the project, management action, or
category of projects or management actions:
a.

deals with a complex system;
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b.

involves a system for which the response to either
stressors or management measures, or both, is
difficult to predict, especially when development
of more detailed information about the system
could help future management actions and
measures;

c.

is subject to unknowns or uncertainties about the
system, its stressors, and/or best management
practices;

d.

requires the agency to regulate or manage the
complex system itself, or significant activities
within or components of the system;

e.

sets a definable overall goal for the system's
management, or effectuates legislation or a rule
that sets a definable overall goal or goals for the
system's management;

f.

provides or allows for identifiable indicators of
progress and/or lack thereof toward the
statutorily or regulatorily defined goal that can be
reliably monitored and meaningfully measured;

g.

allows for multiple management options and
measures, so that adaptive management could
help refine the management measures that the
agency uses in future iterations of a management
plan or project oversight; and

h.

allows for observable system responses to
stressors and/or management measures over ten
years or less so that periodically reviewable
adaptive management plans are possible.

(E) If an agency chooses, pursuant to section (D), to follow the
adaptive management track created by this Act for a specific
project, management action, or category of projects or
management actions, it shall promulgate that decision
through the notice-and-comment ("informal") rulemaking
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procedures identified in 5 U.S.C. § 553 [state equivalent
statute], except that the exceptions noted in that provision
shall not apply to any decision made under this Section.
Public participation shall be as allowed in 5 U.S.C. § 553
[state equivalent statute]. Judicial review of the agency's
decision shall be as allowed in § 6 of this Act.
Section 3: Initial Adaptive Management Plan
(A) Procedures Applicable to the Creation of the Initial
Adaptive Management Plan
(1)

For any project or management action or category of
projects or management actions properly utilizing the
adaptive management track, the agency shall establish
an initial adaptive management plan using the noticeand-comment ("informal") rulemaking procedures of 5
U.S.C. § 553 [state equivalent statute], except that the
exceptions noted in that provision shall not apply to any
decision made under this section. Judicial review of the
initial adaptive management plan shall be as specified in
§ 6 of this Act.

(2)

In addition, the agency shall, in designing its initial
adaptive management plan, in providing public notice of
its proposed initial adaptive management plan, and in
providing opportunities for public comment on that
proposed plan, make reasonable efforts to identify and
offer reasonable opportunities for involvement to
representatives of interested members of the public and
relevant stakeholder groups. While the agency shall
make reasonable efforts to invite and allow public
participation from a balanced group of representatives of
various aspects of the public interest in its project or
management action or category of projects or
management actions, the exact number of participating
representatives and their final composition shall be left
to the agency's sound discretion.
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Components of the Initial Adaptive Management Plan
Every initial adaptive management plan shall contain detailed
findings and determinations regarding each of the following
plan components:
(1)

Goals. The agency shall identify, as specifically as
possible:
a. the overall management goal or goals for the system
that it is managing;
b. the overall management goal or goals for the project,
management action, or category of projects or
management actions that it is undertaking through
the adaptive management track;
c. the specific goals of the management measures that
the agency will implement pursuant to its initial
adaptive management plan;
d. the relationships among (1), (2), and (3); and
e. the relationships of each of (1), (2), and (3) to the
relevant goals, objectives, requirements, and
standards of the legislation that the agency is
implementing through its project or management
action or category of projects or management actions.

(2)

Threats to Goals. The agency shall identify, as
specifically as possible:
a. the existing and predicted stressors to the system
that interfere with the management goal or goals for
the system as a whole; for the project or management
action or category of projects or management actions
subject to the adaptive management track; and for
the management measures to be implemented
pursuant to the initial adaptive management plan;
b. the existing and predicted threats to the system, or to
any of the system's components, that could
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compromise the success of the management measures
to be implemented;
c. perturbations in the system that are occurring or
might occur that could affect either the goal or the
proposed management measures;
d. the agency's uncertainties regarding
stressors, and perturbations; and

threats,

d. the means by which the agency will be able to identify
and address actual interference with its management
goals and management measures from the stressors,
threats, and perturbations that the agency has
identified.
(3)

Indicators for Monitoring. Using the best information
available, the agency shall identify and explain:
a. the system indicators that will or could reveal the
existing and changing relationships among the
agency's management goals; threats, stressors, and
perturbations of the system; and the agency's
proposed management measures;
b. the indicators that the agency plans to monitor
throughout its project or management action;
c. the past status of those indicators (if known);
d. the current status of those indicators;
e. the desired final goal or status for each indicator;
f. changes in indicator status that would indicate a
positive change in the system being managed (i.e., a
change that promotes the ultimate or immediate
management goals) and at least one means of
determining whether such changes are caused by the
management measures that the agency has
implemented;
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g. changes in indicator status that would indicate a
negative change in the system being managed (i.e., a
change that retards the ultimate or immediate
management goals) and at least one means of
determining whether such changes are caused by the
management measures that the agency has
implemented;
h. abort indicators-that is, threshold measurements or
indicator statuses that, individually and collectively,
indicate that the agency's current management
measures should be terminated and a new adaptive
management plan adopted; and
i. finished indicators-that is, threshold measurements
or indicator statuses that, individually or collectively,
signal that the agency's management measures have
achieved the system benefits that they were intended
to achieve.
(4)

Monitoring Plan
a. The agency shall describe in detail its plan for
systematically and consistently monitoring its chosen
indicators using a uniform and scientifically
defensible methodology, including its plan for
collecting and reporting data. The agency shall
explain how its monitoring plan accounts for
stressors, threats, and perturbations and how the
monitoring plan accurately assesses the entire
system being managed in a comprehensive fashion.
b. The agency shall describe its plan for periodically
releasing its monitoring data and reports on its
implementation of the initial adaptive management
plan to the public. The agency shall release all such
data and reports to the public in a form that is both
comprehensible to a lay citizen and utilizable by
experts in the relevant field(s). Unless Congress [the
legislature] specifies otherwise, the agency shall
report its monitoring data to the public at least once
every six months. Unless Congress [the legislature]
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specifies otherwise, the agency shall report on its
implementation of the initial adaptive management
plan at least yearly.
(5)

Initial Management Measures. The agency shall
describe in detail:
a. the initial set of management measures that it
intends to implement and its reasons for choosing
those measures;
b. the results that it expects from its initial
management measures based on best information
available;
c. system or component responses that will induce the
agency to adjust its management measures, with
explanations of why such system responses justify
adjustment the management measures and of how
the agency will make such adjustments to its
management measures;
d. abort indicators-that is, threshold measurements or
indicator statuses that, individually and collectively,
signal that the agency's current management
measures should be terminated and a new adaptive
management plan adopted; and
e. finished indicators-that is, system responses and
achieved indicator statuses that, individually or
collectively, signal that the agency's management
measures have achieved the system benefits that they
were intended to achieve.

(6)

Data and Report Release Schedule. The agency shall
specify a schedule for releasing monitoring data to the
public, with data releases to occur no less frequently than
once every six (6) months. Monitoring data shall be
released in the form specified in § 3(B)(4). The agency
shall also specify a schedule for reporting to the public on
its progress in implementing its adaptive management

ADMIN LAW & ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

2014]

73

plan, with reports to issue no less frequently than once
every year.
(7)

Implementation Period. The agency shall designate
the appropriate implementation period for its adaptive
management plan as follows:
a. If Congress [the legislature] has specified an
implementation period for the project, management
action, or category of projects or management actions
at issue, the agency shall adopt that implementation
period and cite to the relevant legislation.
b. If Congress [the legislature] has not specified an
implementation period for the project, management
action, or category of projects or management actions
at issue, the agency shall specify and justify an
appropriate implementation based on the nature of
the project or management action and the nature and
duration of the management measures to be
implemented. However, unless Congress [the
legislature] has expressly allowed for longer
implementation periods, no implementation period
shall last longer than five (5) years, unless the agency
can justify a longer period through clear and
convincing evidence that a longer period is objectively
necessary to meet statutory goals and objectives and
defined management plan objectives.

(C)

Duration of the Initial Adaptive Management Plan
(1)

The agency's initial adaptive management plan shall
remain active, and the agency shall continue to
implement it, until the first of the following three
termination points occurs:
a. the achievement of abort indicators that the agency
identified pursuant to §§ 3(B)(3)(h) and (5)(D), unless
the agency can attribute those statuses to the
occurrence of an unexpected and temporary
perturbation to the system whose effects are not
expected to be permanent or long lasting; or
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b. the achievement of finished indicators that the
agency identified pursuant to §§ 3(B)(3)(i) and (5)(E),
unless the agency attributes or should attribute those
statuses entirely or significantly to a cause other than
its own management measures; or
c. the ending of the implementation period that the
agency identified pursuant to § 3(B)(6).
(2)

Notice of Termination. The agency shall publish notice
of its intention to terminate the implementation of its
initial adaptive management plan in the Federal
Register [state equivalent]. Unless judicial review of the
agency's decision is sought, the agency shall, at least
thirty-one (31) days but not more than ninety (90) days
after publication of the Federal Register termination
notice, terminate implementation of the initial adaptive
management plan and shall immediately proceed to
adopt a new adaptive management plan pursuant to § 4
of this Act. Judicial review of the agency's decision to
terminate shall be in accordance with § 6.

(3)

Judicial Review. Judicial review of the agency's initial
adaptive management plan shall be as specified in § 6.
However, unless the requirements of § 5 are proven by
clear and convincing evidence, there shall be no judicial
review of the agency's implementation of its finalized
initial adaptive management plan.

(4)

Other Statutes and Procedures Not Applicable.
Unless specified in the legislation authorizing the agency
to undertake its project or management activities, no
other statutes, regulations, or executive orders shall be
deemed to impose any additional requirements,
substantive or procedural, on the agency's creation or
implementation of its initial adaptive management plan.
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Section 4: Subsequent Adaptive Management Plans
(A) An agency pursuing the adaptive management track with
regard to a project, management action, or category of projects
or management actions shall continue to adopt subsequent
adaptive management plans until the agency can demonstrate
that:
(1)

Congress [the legislature] has expressly and specifically
required that the agency terminate the adaptive
management track for the project, management action,
or category of projects or management actions at issue; or

(2)

Congress [the legislature] required the agency to pursue
the adaptive management track and the system has
achieved the system status, indicator statuses, or
management goals that Congress [the legislature]
specified must be achieved in order for the adaptive
management track to be terminated; or

(3)

the agency chose to pursue the adaptive management
track and the agency's management measures,
management actions, and/or projects have generated all
or a significant portion of the information required,
resolved all or almost all of the management
uncertainties, and stably achieved all of the management
goals for the system; or

(4)

the agency chose to pursue the adaptive management
track and
a. repeated achievement of abort indicators; or
b. significantly changed circumstances in the system; or
c. significant new information about the system
indicates that the agency's initial decision to pursue
adaptive management for this project or management
action or category of projects or management actions
was in error or that effective adaptive management
has become impossible or impracticable to implement
for this system.
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Any agency asserting that the circumstances of
paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) have been met must justify
its decision to remove its project, management action, or
category of projects or management actions from the
adaptive management track through a notice-and-

comment ("informal") rulemaking pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

§ 553 [state statutory equivalent], except that the
exceptions noted in that provision shall not apply to any
decision made under this section.
(5)

Judicial review of an agency's decision to remove a
project, management action, or category of projects or
management actions from the adaptive management
track shall be in accordance with § 6 of this Act.

(B) Adoption of Subsequent Adaptive Management Plans
(1)

Adoption through Rulemaking. The agency shall
adopt any subsequent adaptive management plan using
the notice-and-comment
("informal") rulemaking
procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553 [state statutory equivalent],
except that the exceptions noted in that provision shall
not apply to any decision made under this section.
Judicial review of any subsequent adaptive management
plan shall be as specified in § 6.

(2)

Public Participation. In addition, the agency shall, in
designing any subsequent adaptive management plan, in
providing public notice of its proposed plan, and in
providing opportunities for public comment on that
proposed plan, make reasonable efforts to identify and
offer reasonable opportunities for involvement to
representatives of interested members of the public and
relevant stakeholder groups. While the agency shall
make reasonable efforts to invite and allow public
participation from a balanced group of representatives of
various aspects of the public interest in its project or
management action or category of projects or
management actions, the exact number of participating
representatives and their final composition shall be left
to the agency's sound discretion.
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Adaptive

a. Every subsequent adaptive management plan shall
contain all of the components specified in § 3(B) of this
Act.
b. In addition, each subsequent adaptive management
plan shall also:
(i)

Evaluate the monitoring data collected for the
project, management action, or category of
projects or management actions, both in the
most recent implementation of the adaptive
management process and over the course of
the entire adaptive management process.
Such evaluation should indicate whether the
agency
is
making
progress
toward
management goals and, if so, at what rate;
analyze failures of progress; identify stressors,
perturbations, or unexpected events that have
affected the achievement of management
objectives; and indicate whether the agency
can confidently conclude that changes in
indicator statuses are the result of the
agency's management measures. The agency
shall also consider whether new monitoring
methodologies are appropriate, but if it
chooses to adopt such new methodologies, it
shall ensure that data already collected will be
compatible with and comparable to data
collected pursuant to the new methodologies.

(ii)

Based on the data evaluation required in
subparagraph (i), identify and explain any
changes to the previous adaptive management
plan or plans in light of new information,
increased understanding of the system being
managed, increased or decreased risks,
increased
or
decreased
uncertainties,
significant changes to the system or its
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components, identification of the need to
include more or different monitored
indicators, or changes to the authorizing
legislation. The agency must also justify any
changes to its management goals and
objectives with reference to its authorizing
legislation.
(iii) Propose new management measures for the
next implementation period, explaining why
those management measures are appropriate,
desirable, or required.
(C) Duration of Each Subsequent Adaptive Management
Plan
(1)

Each subsequent adaptive management plan shall
remain active, and the agency shall continue to
implement it, until the first of the following three
termination points occurs:
a. the achievement of the abort indicators identified
pursuant to §§ 3(B)(3)(h) and (5)(D), as made
applicable to this section, unless the agency can
attribute those statuses to the occurrence of an
unexpected and temporary perturbation to the
system whose effects are not expected to be
permanent or long lasting; or
b. the achievement of the finished indicator statuses
identified pursuant to §§ 3(B)(3)(i) and (5)(E), as
made applicable to this section, unless the agency
attributes or should attribute those statuses entirely
or significantly to a cause other than its own
management measures; or
c. the ending of the implementation period that the
agency identified pursuant to § 3(B)(6), as made
applicable to this section.

(2)

Notice of Termination. The agency shall publish notice
of its intention to terminate the implementation of its
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current adaptive management plan in the Federal
Register [state equivalent]. Unless judicial review of the
agency's decision is sought, the agency shall, at least
thirty-one (31) days but not more than ninety (90) days
after publication of the Federal Register termination
notice, terminate implementation of the adaptive
management plan and shall immediately proceed to
adopt a new adaptive management plan pursuant to this
section. Judicial review of the agency's decision to
terminate shall be in accordance with § 6.
(3)

Judicial Review. Judicial review of any subsequent
adaptive management plan adopted by the agency shall
be as specified in § 6. However, unless the requirements
of § 5 are proven through clear and convincing evidence,
there shall be no judicial review of the agency's
implementation of any finalized subsequent adaptive
management plan.

(4)

Other Statutes and Procedures Not Applicable.
Unless expressly made applicable in the legislation
authorizing the agency to undertake its project or
management activities, no other statutes, regulations, or
executive orders shall be deemed to impose any
additional requirements, substantive or procedural, on
the agency's creation or implementation of any
subsequent adaptive management plan.

Section 5: Termination of Adaptive
Management
Implementation Because of Emergency Circumstances

Plan

(A) This section applies only during the implementation period for
a finalized adaptive management plan adopted pursuant to

either § 3 or § 4.
(B)

If the implementing agency concludes on the basis of its
ongoing monitoring data that the system has achieved the
abort indicators specified in the adaptive management plan,
the agency shall, unless the agency can attribute those
statuses to the occurrence of an unexpected and temporary
perturbation to the system whose effects are not expected to be
permanent or long lasting, immediately publish notice of its
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intention to terminate the implementation of that plan in the
Federal Register [state equivalent]. Unless judicial review of
the agency's decision is sought, the agency shall, at least
thirty-one (31) days but not more than ninety (90) days after
publication of the Federal Register termination notice,
terminate implementation of the adaptive management plan
and shall immediately proceed to adopt a new adaptive
management plan pursuant to § 4 of this Act. Judicial review
of the agency's decision to terminate shall be in accordance

with § 6.
(C)

If the agency can demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that:
(1)

the system has been subjected to a severe disruption that
was not identified or anticipated in the adaptive
management plan. "Severe disruptions" are limited to
events such as natural disasters, economic collapses, or
acts of war or terrorism; and

(2)

as a result of the severe disruption, all or a significant
portion of the informational bases that informed the
agency's adaptive management plan are no longer true or
accurate,

the agency may immediately publish notice of its intention to
terminate the implementation of that plan in the Federal
Register [state equivalent]. Unless judicial review of the
agency's decision is sought, the agency shall, at least thirtyone (31) days but not more than ninety (90) days after
publication of the Federal Register termination notice,
terminate implementation of the adaptive management plan
and shall immediately proceed to adopt a new adaptive
management plan pursuant to § 4 of this Act. Judicial review
of the agency's decision to terminate shall be in accordance

with § 6.
(D)

Any person may file a petition for mandamus in the U.S.
District Court for the district in which the agency project or
management action is occurring [state court], or in any U.S.
District Court for a district in which the agency may be found
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[alternative state court], if the petitioner can prove by clear
and convincing evidence that:
(1)

the system that the agency is managing achieved the
abort indicators specified in the currently applicable
adaptive management plan;

(2)

the system's achievement of the abort indicators cannot
be attributed in whole or significant part to the
occurrence of an unexpected and temporary perturbation
to the system whose effects are not expected to be
permanent or long lasting;

(3)

the agency has not terminated and is not in the process
of terminating its implementation of the adaptive
management plan;

(4)

the petitioner gave notice to the agency at least sixty (60)
days before filing a mandamus action pursuant to this
subsection that the system had achieved the abort
indicators, with supporting documentation; and

(5)

the system continues to exhibit the abort indicators
identified in the adaptive management plan.

Upon a finding by the court that the petitioner has proven each
of these requirements by clear and convincing evidence, the
court shall order the agency to terminate its current adaptive
management plan and proceed to the adoption of a subsequent
adaptive management plan in accordance with § 4.
(E)

Any person may file a petition for mandamus in the U.S.
District Court for the district in which the agency project or
management action is occurring [state court], or in any U.S.
District Court for a district in which the agency may be found
[alternative state court], if the petitioner can prove by clear
and convincing evidence that:
(1)

the system that the agency is managing has been
subjected to a severe disruption that was not identified
or anticipated in the currently applicable adaptive
management plan. "Severe disruptions" are limited to
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events such as natural disasters, economic collapses, or
acts of war or terrorism; and
(2)

as a direct result of the severe disruption, all or a
significant portion of the informational bases that
informed the agency's adaptive management plan are no
longer true or accurate; and

(3)

there is no valid reason for the agency to continue to
implement its current adaptive management plan; and

(4)

the agency has not terminated and is not in the process
of terminating its implementation of the adaptive
management plan; and

(5)

the petitioner gave notice to the agency at least sixty (60)
days before filing its mandamus action that the system
had been subject to a severe disruption that warranted a
new adaptive management plan, with supporting
documentation; and

(6)

the system continues to be disrupted as a direct result of
the severe disruption identified.

The court shall presume that no unanticipated severe
disruption has occurred and that neither termination of the
plan's implementation nor mandamus is warranted. Upon a
finding by the court that the petitioner has proven each of
these requirements by clear and convincing evidence, the court
shall order the agency to terminate its current adaptive
management plan and proceed to the adoption of a subsequent
adaptive management plan in accordance with § 4.
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Section 6: Judicial Review
(A) If an agency chooses, pursuant to § 2(D) of this Act, to follow
the adaptive management track when Congress does not
explicitly require the agency to do so, or if any agency chooses
pursuant to § 4(A) of this Act to remove a project, management
action, or category of projects or management action from the
adaptive management track, any person may seek judicial
review of the agency's final rule promulgating that decision in
the United States Court of Appeals [state court] for: (1) the
circuit in which the specific project or management action will
occur, if the agency's decision pertains to only one specific
project or management action; or (2) any circuit [district] in
which the agency is found. Challenges to the agency's decision
must be filed in the appropriate Court of Appeals [state court]
within ninety (90) days of the publication in the Federal
Register [state publication] of the agency's final rule
announcing its decision. The reviewing court shall hold
unlawful and set aside the agency's decision to follow the
adaptive management track or to terminate the adaptive
management track if that decision is found to be:
(1)

contrary to Congress's [the legislature's] intent that the
project, management action, or category of projects or
management actions not be placed on the adaptive
management track or not be removed from the adaptive
management track, or otherwise not in accordance with
law;

(2)

arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion;

(3)

in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
limitations, or short of statutory right;

(4)

without observance of procedure required by law; or

(5)

contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity.

authority,

or

(B) Any challenge to an agency's initial adaptive management
plan adopted pursuant to § 3 of this Act, and any challenge to
an agency's subsequent adaptive management plan adopted
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pursuant to § 4 of this Act must be filed with thirty (30) days
of the publication of the final Federal Register notice for that
plan in the United States Court of Appeals [state court] for (1)
the circuit in which the specific project or management action
will occur, if the agency's decision pertains to only one specific
project or management action; or (2) any circuit [district] in
which the agency is found. The reviewing court shall hold
unlawful and set aside the agency's adaptive management
plan if that plan is found to be:
(1)

contrary to Congress's [the legislature's] goals or
management specifications for the system, project,
management action, or category of projects or
management actions;

(2)

arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion;

(3)

without observance of procedure required by law; or

(4)

contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity.

In addition, the court in its sound discretion may award costs
and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.
(C) An agency's implementation of any adaptive management plan
shall be deemed committed to agency discretion by law.
Judicial review of such implementation shall not be allowed
except as provided in § 5 of this Act and by subsections (D), (E),
(F), and (G) of this section. In addition, except as provided in
subsection (G) of this section, no court shall award costs or
attorney fees to challengers/plaintiffs in any action brought to
challenge or terminate an agency's implementation of its
adaptive management plan.
(D) Petitioning parties seeking to terminate an agency's
implementation of an adaptive management plan must
proceed in accordance with § 5(D) or § 5(E) of this Act. The
reviewing court shall presume that judicial review is
inappropriate and unavailable, and it shall construe the
mandamus exceptions provided in § 5 narrowly.
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Any person may challenge an agency's decision to terminate
the implementation of an adaptive management plan
pursuant to §§ 3(C)(1), 4(C)(1), 5(B) or 5(C) of this Act within
thirty (30) days of the agency's publication in the Federal
Register [state equivalent] of its decision to terminate in the
U.S. District Court for the district in which the agency project
or management action is occurring [state court], or in any U.S.
District Court for a district in which the agency may be found
[alternative state court]. The court shall reverse the agency's
decision to terminate and shall reinstate the previously
operative adaptive management plan if the agency's decision
to terminate was not supported by clear and convincing
evidence that the requirements of §§ 3(C)(1), 4(C)(1), 5(B) or
5(C) had been met.

(F) If an agency fails to release monitoring data or to publish an
implementation report within sixty (60) days of the date
specified in the adaptive management plan, any person may
sue for the limited and exclusive purpose of compelling
production of those data or that report. The complaint may be
filed no sooner than sixty (60) days following the date specified
in the adaptive management plan. The complaint may not be
filed more than one hundred twenty (120) days after the date
specified in the adaptive management plan to compel the
release of a set of monitoring data or more than one hundred
eighty (180) days after the date specified in the adaptive
management plan to compel the release of an implementation
report. In no case may a complaint be filed under this section
if the implementation period for the current adaptive
management plan has expired. Lawsuits initiated under this
section shall be filed in the U.S. District- Court for the district
in which the agency project or management action is occurring
[state court], or in any U.S. District Court for a district in
which the agency may be found [alternative state court]. The
court's review shall be strictly limited to (1) determining
whether the agency has failed to release monitoring data or an
implementation report according to the schedule specified in
the current adaptive management plan; and (2) if so, ordering
the agency to release such data or such implementation report
within thirty (30) days of the court's order.
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(G) If an adaptive management plan specifies an implementation
period of three (3) years or longer, and the agency has taken
absolutely no action to implement the plan for at least two (2)
years, any person may challenge the agency's absolute lack of
implementation in the U.S. District Court for the district in
which the agency project or management action is occurring
[state court], or in any U.S. District Court for a district in
which the agency may be found [alternative state court]. The
court shall dismiss the lawsuit immediately upon the agency's
proffer of evidence that:
(1)

the implementation period will or did not last longer than
three (3) years; or

(2)

the adaptive management plan at issue has terminated
or is being terminated; or

(3)

the agency is engaged in ongoing monitoring or data
collection in accordance with the adaptive management
plan; or

(4)

the agency has released monitoring data to the public at
least once in the last two (2) years; or

(5)

the agency has published an implementation report at
least once in the last two (2) years; or

(6)

the agency has implemented or has begun to implement
a management activity specified in the adaptive
management plan at least once in the last two (2) years;
or

(7)

the agency has undertaken any other activity within the
last two (2) years that indicates that it has not completely
abandoned the adaptive management plan.

Any agency securing a dismissal under this section shall be
entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorney fees,
and, in the court's discretion, the plaintiff(s) may be subject to
sanctions for bringing a frivolous lawsuit. If the
implementation period is three (3) years or longer, the
adaptive management plan has not been terminated and is not
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in the process of being terminated, and the agency proffers no
evidence of active implementation as specified, the court shall,
in its sound discretion, either (1) order the agency to
implement the adaptive management plan; (2) terminate the
current adaptive management plan and order the agency to
adopt a new adaptive management plan; or (3) terminate the
current adaptive management plan and terminate the
agency's participation in the adaptive management track.
Plaintiff(s) securing such an order under this section shall be
entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees.
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